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No community with a sense of justice, compassion or respect for basic
human rights should accept the current pattern of adaptation. Leaving the
world's poor to sink or swim with their own meager resources in the face of the
threat posed by climate change is morally wrong. Unfortunately . . . this is
precisely what is happening. We are drifting into a world of "adaptation
apartheid "
-Cape Town Archbishop Emeritus, Desmond Tutu'
I. INTRODUCTION
There is now little doubt that humans will be forced to adapt to the
impacts of a warming world. There is also little doubt that the poorest people in
the poorest countries will bear most of the burden of adapting to climate
consequences they had almost no role in creating.2 As the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) has explained, "In the Netherlands, people
are investing in homes that can float on water. The Swiss Alpine ski industry is
investing in artificial snow-making machines," but "[i]n the Horn of Africa,
'adaptation' means that women and young girls walk further to collect water."3
In the Ganges and Mekong Deltas, "people are erecting bamboo flood shelters
on stilts" and "planting mangroves to protect themselves against storm surges."
A final adaptation strategy in the Mekong? "[W]omen and children are being
taught to swim."4
Despite these sobering realities, the question of whether climate change
implicates human rights law at all has been relatively unexplored until
recently.5 In 2007, for example, the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)-the primary report from
the United Nations-chartered body responsible for reviewing and assessing
information on climate change-scarcely mentioned human rights in nearly
3,000 pages of analysis.6 However, multiple actors have begun to close this
1. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, FIGHTING CLIMATE
CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED WORLD 47-48, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/medial
HDR 20072008 EN Cxyzomplete.pdf [hereinafter UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2007/2008].
2. INTERGOV'TAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT
19 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC, SYNTHESIS REPORT].
3. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 13.
4. Id.
5. Of course, "climate change" itself does not violate human rights. As this Article explains,
human rights law only holds states accountable for violations of human rights through their action or
inaction. Hence, states themselves may violate human rights law in causing and responding-or failing
to respond-to climate change.
6. See INTERGOV'TAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT
(Rajendra K. Pachauri & Andy Reisinger eds., 2007); INT'L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY,
CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A ROUGH GUIDE 3 (2008), available at http://
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analytical gap: small island states and indigenous populations have claimed in a
variety of international fora that climate change has threatened the human
rights of their people; an increasing number of academic commentators have
worked to explain how climate change issues implicate human rights law;8 and
in 2009, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
issued the first UN report addressing the links between climate change and
human rights.9
The increasing incorporation of human rights law in climate change
analysis is important, and the efforts to link climate change and human rights
law have shifted from asking whether there is such a connection to examining
the implications of the relationship. This recognition that climate change
implicates human rights is significant because it provides a tangible legal
framework for analyzing state actions that lead to climate change. Indeed,
because the primary blame for climate change lies with the developed states
that have caused the problem,o and because human rights analyses are
typically centered on state action, human rights provides a lens through which
to analyze developed countries' culpability.
Analyzing climate change through a human rights lens is also appropriate
because, in the worst-case scenario, climate change spells human catastrophe-
rising seas, the spread of disease, and ecosystem collapse-particularly for the
most vulnerable persons in the global community. Human rights analyses can
frame proactive strategies to try to preempt human harm as well as to respond
to such catastrophic events ex post.
Hence, commentators, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and
international governance bodies have started to investigate the relationship
between climate change and human rights. So far, however, this discussion has
largely focused on issues such as the international mechanisms for reducing
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,II climate justice and state interest in such
www.ichrp.org/files/summaries/35/136_summary.pdf [hereinafter ICHRP, CLIMATE CHANGE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS].
7. Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from
Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States (Dec. 7,
2005) [hereinafter IAC, Inuit Petition], available at http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/files/uploads/icc-
files/FINALPetitionICC.pdf; Submission of the Maldives to the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (Sept. 25, 2008) [hereinafter OHCHR, Maldives Submission], available at http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/climatechange/docs/submissions/MaldivesSubmission.pdf; see John H.
Knox, Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations, 33 HARV. ENVT'L. L. REV.
477, 479-80 (2009) [hereinafter Knox, Linking Human Rights].
8. See, e.g., David B. Hunter, Human Rights Implications for Climate Change Negotiations,
11 OR. REV. INT'L L. 331, 332 (2009); John H. Knox, Climate Change and Human Rights Law, 164 VA.
J. INT'L L. 163, 168 (2009) [hereinafter Knox, Climate Change]; Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change
"International"? Litigation's Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 598-99 (2009).
9. See Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Rep. of the Office of the U.N.
High Comm'rfor Human Rights on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights, at 5,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009) [hereinafter OHCHR Report].
10. Texas (population 23 million) emits more carbon dioxide than all of sub-Saharan Africa
(population 720 million). UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 43.
11. E.g., Charlotte Streck, Expectations and Reality of the Clean Development Mechanism: A
Climate Finance Instrument Between Accusations and Aspirations, in CLIMATE FINANCE: REGULATORY
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reductions,12 and impacts on communities that are likely to be entirely
destroyed or forced to resettle. 3 Indeed, in this rights-focused discourse,
mitigation-or reducing GHG emissions to reduce the extent of climate
change-has largely taken center stage. Human rights commentators have
expended significantly less effort analyzing the legal framework for, or
implications of, the process of adaptation to climate change-in other words,
responding to actual or expected human and environmental consequences of a
changing climate to minimize the harm from such change. 14 In the coming
years, states and communities will have to adapt to irreversible climate change
due to cumulative GHG emissions to date, as well as to additional climate
change that will occur absent significant action by the international community.
Thus, the recent discourse linking human rights and climate change has largely
overlooked a major component of the human rights issues created by climate
change. It is important to explore differences between mitigation and
adaptation from a human rights perspective; indeed, adaptation policies will
immediately impact many people who stand to suffer climate change-related
human rights violations. Further, discourse on adaptation in the legal arena has
lagged significantly behind discussion of adaptation in other fields-biology,
economics, and geography, to name only a few-in which robust debates
regarding adaptation have been occurring for years.
AND FUNDING STRATEGIES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 67, 67-75 (Richard B.
Stewart et al. eds., 2009); Jonathan B. Wiener, Property and Prices To Protect the Planet, 19 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 515 (2009). See generally LEGAL ASPECTS OF CARBON TRADING: KYOTO,
COPENHAGEN, AND BEYOND (David Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds., 2009) (discussing carbon trading
inside and outside the Kyoto framework as well as the future of carbon markets).
12. E.g., Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 1531 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. The United States and China? The Complex
Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675 (2008);
see also Ann Prouty, The Clean Development Mechanism and Its Implications for Climate Justice, 34
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 513 (2009) (discussing a "climate justice" rationale for mitigating GHG
emissions).
13. E.g., Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a
Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349 (2009).
14. Articles primarily devoted to climate change adaptation (as opposed to mitigation) have
appeared in the literature only very recently. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to
Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Structure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1 (2009); Daniel
H. Cole, Climate Change, Adaptation, and Development, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (2008);
Robin Kundis Craig, "Stationarity is Dead"-Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate
Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 9 (2010); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation
and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363 (2010) [hereinafter Ruhl,
Climate Change Adaptation]; J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive
Capacity in Legal Systems: Applications to Climate Change Adaptation Law, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1473
(2011) [hereinafter Ruhl, General Design Principles]; J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past:
The Theory and Practice of Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 49-55
(2011).
15. See, e.g., Jon Barnett, Adapting to Climate Change in Pacific Island Countries: The
Problem of Uncertainty, 29 WORLD DEv. 977, 980-81 (2001); Barry Smit et al., An Anatomy of
Adaptation to Climate Change and Variability, 45 CLIMATE CHANGE 223, 223-25 (2000); Emma L.
Tompkins & W. Neil Adger, Does Adaptive Management of Natural Resources Enhance Resilience to
Climate Change?, ECOLOGY & SOC'Y, Oct. 15, 2004, at 13-15. Like the evolving scholarship on
reducing the extent of climate change, the scant legal adaptation scholarship that does exist has not
addressed human rights. See generally Cole, supra note 14, at 2-4 (making the case for discussing
adaptation and focusing on the moral obligation of developed countries to assist developing countries);
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As Archbishop Tutu and the UNDP have made clear, there are
compelling reasons to explore the legal-not to mention moral and ethical-
implications of adaptation. In this Article, therefore, we argue that as legal
discourse evolves to analyze the human rights implications of climate change
and the duties of states to protect and fulfill those rights-duties oriented
vertically, horizontally, and diagonally-it is important both analytically and
normatively to separate discussions of mitigation from those of adaptation.
Beginning such an analysis in this Article, we demonstrate that although the
distinction between policies and projects related to mitigation rather than
adaptation is functional rather than formal, the two types of policies and
projects implicate human rights differently.' 6 As such, our first claim is that
future work of international bodies, NGOs, and commentators must be more
rigorous in recognizing and discussing the legal doctrinal differences between
the human rights issues in climate change mitigation and those in climate
change adaptation.' 7
Setting up this distinction between the differing human rights
implications of the two frameworks allows us to make a second claim about
human rights law and its potential to shape adaptation policy. Our human rights
argument is that the conventional, mitigation-centric account of the relationship
between human rights and climate change-which applies a rigid human rights
framework to the management-based problem of climate change-is, even if
normatively desirable, akin to fitting a square peg in a round hole. Such
management-based problems frequently involve technical experts, policy
analysts, and policymakers who collectively negotiate and design long-term,
coordinated solutions to a particular problem; in the case of climate change,
these solutions require coordinated action at the international level to regulate
public actors and the private sector alike.' 8 That human rights are often
incongruous with such a complex management-based approach is widely
recognized.' 9 But although the human rights account of climate change has
been riddled with conceptual tensions in the mitigation context (because
climate change is unlikely to be stopped or fully mitigated), a human rights
approach is far more able to address adaptation.20 While bringing human rights
claims against a state for its failure to mitigate can be conceptually problematic,
particularly in terms of attaching liability to a legal duty-holder, bringing
similar claims because of a state's failure to adapt is more conceptually
sound.21 We demonstrate that the prevailing mitigation-based approaches are
Craig, supra note 14, at 14-17 (discussing the need for U.S. environmental law to evolve and address
climate change adaptation).
16. For a more detailed discussion of these concepts, see infra Section II.B.
17. See infra Section III.B.
18. Hunter, supra note 8, at 339.
19. See, e.g., John H. Knox, Diagonal Environmental Rights, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 82, 82, 101-02 (Mark Gibney & Sigrun Skogly eds., 2010).
20. See infra Section III.B.
21. See infra Section IV.B (discussing the reduced causation problems that typically exist in
applying human rights to "climate change" when human rights are applied only to adaptive aspects of
3 132012]
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not ideally suited to the climate change problem because they contain a rigid
state actor requirement and because they lack a multiscalar approach-which
considers actors from the international level down to the community level-
necessary to address climate change. 22
In turn, human rights may be a powerful tool for helping to organize and
unify adaptation efforts. Thus, in addition to countering several of the logistics-
based objections to applying a human rights framework to climate change, an
adaptation framework can incorporate important human rights considerations,
which we argue is currently not taking place on a broad enough scale.
Moreover, such policies can better moderate-if not avoid altogether-the
growing threat of "adaptation apartheid." 23
24
Building on our discussion of various adaptive practices and policies,
we focus on adaptation as a critical step in addressing the human effects of
climate change. Although we rely on a burgeoning and important body of
literature that links human rights and climate change broadly,25 most scholars
have given insufficient weight to the distinction between mitigation and
adaptation.26 To date, commentators have not offered a detailed discussion of
adaptation-specific issues-as distinct from mitigation issues-through a
human rights lens.27 This Article thus fills a gap in the literature by providing
the first detailed discussion of why a human rights approach to adaptation is
less conceptually problematic than a human rights approach to mitigation (or to
climate change more generally). It also presents the first in-depth analysis of
what such a human rights approach to adaptation will require.
The Article proceeds in four parts. In Part II, we lay the groundwork for
our argument, summarizing the challenge that climate change poses to people
and communities and the recent history of the theory, policies, and projects of
climate change).
22. See infra Section II.B.
23. See infra Section II.C.
24. See infra Section II.B.
25. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 8.
26. See infra notes 54-55.
27. Some authors have discussed the legal implications of (or questions raised by) adaptation
but have not taken a human rights approach. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 14, at 3, 7-9 (calling for a focus
on adaptation and arguing for an emphasis on strengthening adaptive capacity of least-developed
countries); Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 1, 2-3 (2007) (exploring issues of who should pay for the spectrum of adaptation costs); Ruh],
General Design Principles, supra note 14; see also Elizabeth C. Black, Climate Change Adaptation:
Local Solutions for a Global Problem, 22 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 364-82 (2010) (focusing on
municipal efforts to include adaptation in planning decisions); Orr Karassin, Mind the Gap: Knowledge
and Need in Regulating Adaptation to Climate Change, 22 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 383, 388-89
(2010) (describing different national-level regulatory efforts to incorporate adaptation in developed
states); Armin Rosencranz, Dilpreet Singh & Jahnavi G. Pai, Climate Change Adaptation, Policies, and
Measures in India, 22 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 575 (2010) (reviewing adaptive capacity and
particular adaptation projects in India); Lindsay F. Wiley, Moving Global Health Law Upstream: A
Critical Appraisal of Global Health Law As a Tool for Health Adaptation to Climate Change, 22 GEO.
INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 439 (2010) (discussing the linkages between climate change and health law and
policy); cf Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 14, at 406-09 (noting the "human rights




climate change adaptation. In Part III, we move to a discussion of the linkages
between climate change and human rights, particularly for already-vulnerable
residents of developing countries, examining some of the legal limitations in
applying human rights to climate change when the problem is narrowly framed
to encompass only mitigation. Part III nonetheless highlights the potential of
human rights as a tool to mobilize action in response to climate change. In Part
IV, we examine the application of human rights law to adaptation. We contend
that claims under human rights instruments based on a state's failure to adapt
sufficiently to climate change are less problematic than claims related to a
state's causing and then failing to mitigate climate change, because adaptation
more easily fulfills human rights' rigid state-actor and causation requirements
than does mitigation. A human rights approach is especially well-suited for
considering adaptation, and we argue that previous commentators have been
insufficiently rigorous in parsing human rights law's respective relationships
with climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation. Finally, Part V
examines the implications of incorporating human rights law into the law and
policy of adaptation. It provides a normative vision of how a human rights-
informed view of adaptation can mobilize the international community
politically and help guide the distribution of limited adaptation funding to
better meet individuals' most pressing needs. We conclude that there is value in
considering human rights principles in adaptation policies and projects and
explore a number of policy areas in which a human rights framework could be
particularly beneficial.
II. ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE
For decades, political efforts to address climate change focused
exclusively on efforts to "mitigate" the phenomenon-to slow, stop, or reverse
climate change by reducing the GHG emissions that cause it. Mitigation efforts
have typically taken place at the international and state levels and have been
aimed at lessening the necessary conditions for climate change. However, as
we explain, the consensus is now that human populations will have to do more
than mitigate climate change; they also must adapt to the effects of climate
change-primarily global warming and the many expected adverse effects of
that change. "Adaptation" thus entails designing and instituting policies and
28programs to respond to the inevitable effects of climate change. Whereas
mitigation centers on shaping human behavior to minimize the level and cause
of climate change (namely GHG emissions), adaptation efforts rely upon the
ability of species, ecosystems, and socio-ecological systems to respond to
ongoing alterations in climate conditions and to reduce the effects of climate
change.29
28. INTERGOV'TAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 6 (M.L. Parry et at. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC, ADAPTATION
REPORT] ("Adaptation is the adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected
climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.").
29. Craig, supra note 14, at 21; see also ICHRP, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
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With these definitions in mind, this Part begins with a primer on climate
change. Next, we turn to a discussion of adaptation and how it differs from
climate change mitigation. Finally, we conclude this Part with a discussion of
how the global community-and the community of multilateral donors in
particular-is beginning to fund adaptation plans and projects, especially in the
least developed states.
A. The Challenge of Climate Change
Physicist Niels Bohr famously proclaimed, "Prediction is very difficult,
especially if it's about the future." 30 Bohr's cautionary statement is important to
heed in discussions of climate change. The scientific consensus 3 is that over
the coming decades climate change will cause a steady increase in human
exposure to serious climate events such as droughts, floods, and storms, with
extreme weather events becoming more frequent and more intense.32
The magnitude of climate change and its impacts will depend in large part
on the increasing concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere. Atmospheric
concentrations of CO 2 are increasing by approximately 1.9 parts per million
(ppm) every year, whereas in the 8,000 years prior to industrialization,
atmospheric CO2 increased by a total of 20 ppm.33 If emissions continue to rise
supra note 6, at 21 (.'Adaptation' refers to actions taken to adjust lives and livelihoods to the new
conditions brought about by warming temperatures and associated climate changes."); OHCRH Report,
supra note 9, at 6 ("Adaptation aims to strengthen the capacity of societies and ecosystems to cope with
and adapt to climate change risks and impacts."); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2009) ("Adaptation refers to changes made to
better respond to present or future climatic and other environmental conditions, thereby reducing harm
or taking advantage of opportunity."); WALTER VERGARA, WORLD BANK, ADAPTING TO CLIMATE
CHANGE 18 (2005) (Adaptation is "(a) adjustments to the pace of use or access to the natural resource
base in order to maintain reliable services from the affected ecosystem, or (b) reorganization to reduce
exposure to loss or to exploit new opportunities from the affected resource.").
30. DAVID ORRELL, THE FUTURE OF EVERYTHING: THE SCIENCE OF PREDICTION 1 (2009).
31. This Article does not aim to engage the debates surrounding the existence of human-
induced climate change. That debate is beyond our expertise and, regardless, a law journal is not the
forum for it. However, a brief background in the implications of climate change is necessary to
understand the interplay between climate change adaptation and human rights. According to the UNDP,
for example, "[u]nderstanding the scientific evidence on climate change is a starting point for
understanding the human development challenges of the 21st Century." UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 31. Nor is our purpose to debate the IPCC's Fourth Assessment
Report. See Keith Johnson, Panel on Climate Faces Challenges, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI0001424052748704197104575051620263103684.html. Hundreds of
scientists have gone on the record in defense of the IPCC's "excellent performance for accurately
reporting the state-of-the-science" and its "very low rate of error." Open Letter from Scientists in the
United States on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and Errors Contained in the Fourth
Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007 (Mar. 12, 2010) (Gary W. Yohe et al.), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/regulation/papers/YoheOpenLetter.pdf.
32. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 90. Most
dramatically, although perhaps overstating the level of complete accord, one scholar has stated that "the
occurrence of global climate change is no longer challenged." Sumudu Atapattu, Global Climate
Change: Can Human Rights (and Human Beings) Survive This Onslaught?, 20 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 35, 37 (2008).
33. See INTERGOV'TAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS 131, 460 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007). Ice-core evidence shows current
atmospheric CO 2 concentrations exceeding the natural range of the last 650,000 years. Id. at 447.
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consistent with the current trend, there will be not only an increase in total
emissions but also an increase in the rate at which emissions are increasing,
perhaps by 4 to 5 ppm per year by 2035-almost double the current rate.3 4
Low-income countries worldwide have one-third of the world's residents
and yet contribute only seven percent of total global emissions; wealthy
countries, by contrast, have contributed seventy percent of all CO 2 emitted
since the dawn of the industrial era. 35 In the cases of Britain and the United
States, historic emissions amount to approximately 1,100 tons of CO 2 per
capita, compared to sixty-six tons per capita for China and twenty-three tons
for India. 36 The world's past trends of carbon use are increasingly recognized
as unsustainable. As Mahatma Gandhi presciently noted at the time of India's
independence, and decades before the modem environmental movement began,
"It took Britain half the resources of this planet to achieve its prosperity. How
many planets will India require for development?" 37 In all likelihood, then,
emission levels will continue to rise for the foreseeable future as emerging
economies engage in rigorous development activities.
Scientific consensus overwhelmingly supports the link between emissions
and rising global temperatures. Research reveals that temperatures in the past
fifty years are likely the highest they have been in any similar length of time
since at least the eighth century. 38 According to the IPCC's estimates, baseline
temperatures around the world are already around 1.33 degrees Fahrenheit
higher than in earlier years and will continue to increase, even with aggressive
mitigation efforts. 39 Evidence that the climate is warming is now unequivocal.4
The expected change in the climate will have a variety of consequences
for human health, security, and stability. The consequences may be most
pronounced for poorer developing countries because of their geographic
characteristics (in many cases), their low incomes, and their greater reliance on
climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture. Notably, climate change will have
a particularly significant effect on water resources in dry regions at the mid-
34. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 34.
35. Id. at 41-42.
36. Climate Analysis Indicators Tool, WORLD RES. INST., http://www.wri.org/climate/
project description2.cfn?pid=93 (last visited Mar. 21, 2012). The cumulative effect of emissions-i.e.,
the "historic emissions"-matters because past emissions drive current climate change, and the envelope
for absorbing tomorrow's emissions is a residual function of emissions in the past. UNDP, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 41. For example, even with immediate reductions,
contraction of the Greenland ice sheet would likely lead to sea level rise continuing after the year 2100.
IPCC, SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 12.
37. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 47-48.
38. Id. at 31. Most evidence suggests that this worrisome trend is accelerating, with eleven of
the twelve warmest years since industrialization occurring between 1995 and 2006. IPCC, SYNTHESIS
REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. Even worse, on a decade-to-decade comparison, linear warming for the past
half-century is nearly twice that of the past 100 years. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2007/2008, supra note 1, at 31.
39. IPCC, SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-7. Even the most stringent mitigation steps
will be unable to materially affect average temperature before the 2030s at the earliest, and temperatures
under this scenario will not peak until 2050. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra
note 1, at 2-3.
40. IPCC, SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
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latitudes and mid-tropics.41 Climate change also will have a significant effect
on human health, especially in developing countries. Diarrhea, respiratory
diseases, and vector-, food-, and water-borne illnesses are expected to increase
as a result of the manifestations of climate change, as are related deaths.42
Increased variability in climate will also lower food production, especially in
the developing countries least able to modify agricultural techniques to deal
with climate-based changes. 43
The degree to which climate change will increase natural disasters is
somewhat less clear, though the general prognosis is poor. Although direct
linkages may be difficult to identify in many cases, climate change creates
systemic conditions for more frequent and more extreme weather events.44
Some of climate change's most acute challenges will fall on coastal and island
nations, which likely will have to respond to sea-level rise, erosion, damage to
their fishing and tourism economies, and salt water encroachment on fresh
water, all with a deleterious effect on livelihoods and living conditions. 45
Other consequences will likely include an increase in large storms
threatening human security and an increase in ground instability in mountain
and permafrost regions.' Finally, climate change will also likely lead to
increasing regional and intrastate conflicts and instabilities, with concomitant
expense to government and private industry, as well as new, large-scale
problems such as "climate refugees"-refugees displaced from their homes by
climate change.47
The descriptions above are primarily environmental accounts of the
effects of unmitigated GHG emissions. In large part, the actual toll of climate
change on humans will depend on how communities are able to adapt to the
changes already underway. If the current emissions trajectory remains
unchecked, there is a very high probability of dangerous climate change
outcomes, with a toll that "would provide a continuum from near-term human
development setbacks to long-term ecological disaster." 48 There is no clear line
separating "safe" climate change from "dangerous" climate change. Scientific
consensus has coalesced around the idea that the risk of massive human
41. See MARK DAVIES ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION, DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
AND SOCIAL PROTECTION (2009), available at http://oecd.org/dataoecd/63/10143514563.pdf.
42. See Jesse Jenkins, Warnings from a Warming World: World Meteorological Organization
Reports on Extreme Weather Events, IT'S GETTING HOT IN HERE (Aug. 7, 2007),
http://itsgettinghotinhere.org/2007/08/07/warnings-from-a-warming-world-world-meteorological-
organization-reports-on-extreme-weather-events/.
43. WILLIAM JAMES BURROUGHS, CLIMATE CHANGE: A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH
132 (2001).
44. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 77.
45. See Knox, Climate Change, supra note 8, at 479-80.
46. IPCC, SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
47. See, e.g., Docherty & Giannini, supra note 13, at 349 (advocating for a new international
treaty on climate refugees).
48. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 31. There are also
events that can be predicted to occur with a given warming level but at an unknown time or magnitude,
such as reversal of the meridional overturning circulation, which is the massive conveyor of warmer
water through the Atlantic toward Europe. See IPCC, SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 12, 14.
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development setbacks increases substantially beyond 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit of
temperature change over historic levels, a degree of change which current
emissions trajectories will well exceed.49 Adapting to such changes will be a
significant and important endeavor-and one that is quite distinct from the
parallel task of continuing to mitigate further climate change.
B. Adaptation Versus Mitigation in Climate Change Response
Although the international community has increasingly recognized that
mitigating climate change is a distinct endeavor from adapting to climate
change, human rights practitioners, scholars, and policymakers have yet to
capture fully the legal relevance of the distinctions between the two activities.
To date, legal scholars and practitioners analyzing climate change have
typically discussed mitigation, whether they have considered actions the United
States should take to address climate change,50 or more international responses
to climate change such as the Kyoto Protocol,51 emissions debates leading up to
52and following the Copenhagen and Cancun negotiations, incentives to reduce
Chinese emissions, and climate justice and emissions limits,54 to name only a
few. Where commentators have started to discuss adaptation, most only
mention in passing that their theses apply to both mitigation and adaptation
49. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 6-7.
50. See, e.g., Freeman & Guzman, supra note 12, at 1531; Jason Scott Johnston, Climate
Change Confusion and the Supreme Court, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2008); Sunstein, supra note 12,
at 1678; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (concerning a suit brought by states and
localities against the EPA to force it to mitigate the effects of GHGs); Teresa B. Clemmer, Staving Off
the Climate Crisis: The Sectoral Approach Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ENVTL. L. 1125, 1138-56
(2010) (advocating using the Clean Air Act to achieve emissions reductions in order to address climate
change); Daniel A. Farber, The Case for Climate Compensation: Justice for Climate Change Victims in
a Complex World, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 377, 380 (discussing the United States' moral responsibilities for
climate change and a concomitant compensation scheme for developing states).
51. The Kyoto Protocol was not silent on adaptation. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change art. XII, 1 8, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1(1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
However, the focus of the Kyoto Protocol and the analysis of its creation, implementation, and effects
have unquestionably dealt with mitigation. See, e.g., Eric Shaffner, Repudiation and Regret: Is the
United States Sitting Out the Kyoto Protocol to its Economic Detriment?, 37 ENVTL. L. 441, 446-57
(2007).
52. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Conference: A Postmortem, 104
AM. J. INT'L L. 230, 231-34 (2010) (discussing the evolution of the climate change debate by describing
steps that countries have taken to reduce GHG emissions and establish carbon intensity targets, but
failing to acknowledge any role of adaptation in the evolutionary process).
53. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 905, 905 (2008) ("The central problem confronting climate change scholars and policymakers is
how to create incentives for China and the United States to make prompt, large emissions reductions.").
54. See, e.g., Edith Brown Weiss, 9 VT. J. ENvTL. L. 615, 622-27 (2008) (discussing
normative principles of intergenerational equity for developing enforceable international norms to
address climate change); Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal
for a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169, 171-73 (2008) (highlighting the
harmful effects of cap-and-trade emissions policies on marginalized communities and proposing use of
adaptation funds to minimize harm); Mark A. Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in International
Environmental Law, 76 TUL. L. REV. 843, 862-86 (2002) (discussing "shared compacts" between
developing states seeking technical and financial assistance and developed states that want developing
states to enter global environmental governance).
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issues or implicitly group mitigation and adaptation issues together as "climate
change"55 without exploring the distinct characteristics of the two activities.
Further, scholars have not fully explored adaptation's disproportionate effects
on marginalized persons and groups and the related human rights
implications.56 In this Article, we now elucidate unique features of each, before
examining the relationship between climate change adaptation and human
rights law. 7
1. Distinguishing Adaptation from Mitigation
Although both mitigation and adaptation are critical components of a
55. Kyung-wha Kang, Deputy High Comm'r for Human Rights, Office of the U.N. High
Comm'r for Human Rights, Address at the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC and its Kyoto
Protocol (Dec. 14, 2007), available at http://www.maldivesmission.ch/fileadmin/PdflEnvironment/
DHCStatement BaliFinal.pdf ("[A]ny strategy to deal with climate change, whether in terms of
adaptation or mitigation, must incorporate the consequences for humans, as individuals and
communities, and the human rights framework is the most effective way to do so."); see Brooke Ackerly
& Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change Justice: The Challenge for Global Governance, 20 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 553, 555 (2008); Atapattu, supra note 32, at 37, 39; Deepa Badrinarayana, Global
Warming: A Second Coming for International Law, 85 WASH. L. REV. 253, 288 (2010); William Boyd,
Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-
Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 457, 462 (2011); Jonathan C. Carlson, Reflections on a
Problem of Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Rights of States in a Minimalist International
Legal Order, 18 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 46-47, 52 (2009); Paul G. Harris, The
European Union and Environmental Change: Sharing the Burdens of Global Warming, 17 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL L. & POL'Y 309, 318, 345 (2006); Paul L. Joffe, Conscience and Interest: Law, Rights, and
Politics in the Struggle To Confront Climate Change and the New Poverty, 6 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 269, 272-75 (2009); Stephen L. Kass, Integrated Justice: Human Rights, Climate Change, and
Poverty, 18 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 137-39 (2009); Knox, Climate Change, supra
note 8, at 208, 213-14; Knox, Linking Human Rights, supra note 7, at 477; Timo Koivurova,
International Legal Avenues To Address The Plight of Victims of Climate Change: Problems and
Prospects, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 267 (2007); Marc Limon, Human Rights and Climate Change:
Constructing a Case for Political Action, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 440 (2009); Siobhn
McInerney-Lankford, Climate Change and Human Rights: An Introduction to Legal Issues, 33 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 431, 435-36 (2009); Osofsky, supra note 8, at 598-99; Amy Sinden, Climate Change
and Human Rights, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 255, 263-70 (2007); Rebecca Tsosie,
Sustainability: Moving From Theory to Practical Application, 4 ENVTL & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 188,
202 (2009); Sara C. Aminzadeh, Note, A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights Implications of Climate
Change, 30 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 231, 259 (2007).
56. See, e.g., OHCHR Report, supra note 9, at 6; Jennifer K. Barcelos, Gregory A. Hicks &
Jennifer Marlow, The Three Degree Conference: One Year Later, 85 WASH. L. REV. 193, 195-96 (2010)
(explaining, in a symposium's introductory article, how a human rights framework can be applied to on-
the-ground adaptation work); Ira R. Feldman & Joshua H. Kahan, Preparing for the Day After
Tomorrow: Frameworks for Climate Change Adaptation, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 61, 67
(2007) (noting the need to move toward implementing adaptation strategies as a matter of policy rather
than research). But see ICHRP, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 21-27; Hunter,
supra note 8, at 359-61 (differentiating between human rights law's respective application to mitigation
and adaptation, but engaging in a limited discussion of adaptation).
57. We recognize that mitigation efforts remain crucial to addressing climate change. As the
IPCC has noted, "[u]nmitigated climate change would, in the long term, be likely to exceed the capacity
of natural, managed and human systems to adapt." IPCC, SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 19
(emphasis omitted). Rights-based approaches to adaptation are potentially worthless if progress is not
made on mitigation. Yet, the UNDP has cited the unequal distribution of the effects of climate change as
one of the most important reasons to take action to reduce carbon emissions, UNDP, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at v, and the IPCC has explained that "[a]daptation is
necessary in the short and longer term to address impacts resulting from the warming that would occur
even for the lowest stabilization scenarios assessed," IPCC, SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.
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comprehensive climate change response, in certain respects, adapting to climate
change is more complex than mitigating it. Discussing adaptation versus
mitigation in the domestic context, Robin Kundis Craig has explained that
despite the incredible difficulty and complexity of reducing GHG emissions,
the foundational regulatory mechanisms available to accomplish the goal are
somewhat limited in number, essentially consisting of cap-and-trade programs,
carbon taxes, mandated changes in manufacturing processes, or some
combination of these.58 "Climate change adaptation law will be dealing with
complexity at another order of magnitude because," Professor Craig argues,
"the effects of climate change will themselves be complex-ever-changing,
often unpredictable, and subject to feedback mechanisms that may not be
completely understood and that may change over time."59 As such, there is
likely no one adaptation program to undertake over time; rather, adaptation
approaches must be flexible and, as the name itself suggests, adaptive.
Adaptation responses can be thought of as either proactive or reactive
(or a mix of the two), with proactive responses addressing anticipated impacts
from climate change, and reactive responses addressing climate-related harms
that already have impacted people or ecosystems. 0 And "adaptation law will
have to cope with multiple layers of governmental interest, since many
adaptation strategies will have to be intensely local in implementation, while
adaptation principles and goals may need to operate on a larger scale,"
regionally, nationally, or internationally.6 Successful adaptive measures must
map onto the complicated landscape of governmental and nongovernmental
entities that must cooperatively work on adaptation. Lastly, human rights
approaches to adaptation face the complex task of connecting adaptation
strategies with a narrow and limited pool of rights created to serve a different
set of purposes.
To begin, there are a number of features that distinguish adaptation
practices from mitigation practices; importantly for our purposes here, these
distinctions have implications for applying a human rights approach to climate
change. First, adaptation and mitigation practices are generally undertaken on
different geographic scales, with mitigation practices more global or
continental in nature than adaptation practices. Mitigation efforts begin in state-
level talks that lead to international agreements.62 Federal governments and
national policymakers in each state typically implement mitigation agreements.
By contrast, during the debates in Copenhagen over adaptation funding, it was
clear that, in part because adaptation involves more localized work, developing
countries wanted greater control of adaptation policies within their territory.63
58. See Craig, supra note 14, at 28-3 1.
59. Id. at 29.
60. See discussion infra Section III.D.
61. Craig, supra note 14, at 29.
62. See Heather McGray, From Copenhagen to Cancun: Adaptation, WORLD RES. INST. (May
13, 2010), http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/05/copenhagen-cancun-adaptation.
63. See Adaptation Fund Board, Project/Programme Proposal for Senegal, AFB Doc.
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Nongovernmental entities such as bilateral and multilateral donors also play a
critical role in adaptation funding. The localized nature of adaptation can be
seen in the workings of the Adaptation Fund. Its funding and governance
structure integrally involve developing countries; the Fund operates on a local
scale by providing funding directly to certified national implementing entities.6
The funds are then distributed locally, or in some cases, local or regional
groups apply for funding directly and engage in personal or local projects in
capacity building or agriculture management, rather than national-scale
mitigation projects that are focused on an entire state's emissions.
Second, different levels of government play different roles in the two
facets of climate change, with mitigation engaging more international and
national governance structures and adaptation engaging these structures
together with regional, state, tribal, aboriginal, and local structures. The
international approach to mitigation has primarily followed the management
approach used for other complex environmental problems.66 This style is
reflected in the growth, focus, and character of the climate change secretariat in
Bonn, Germany, which is a collection of technical experts, climate scientists,
and policy analysts, who together form a large-scale bureaucracy for setting
and managing the foundation of the market for carbon. 67 The secretariat's
primary role is to address mitigation: it collects and exchanges data detailing
GHG emissions, mitigation efforts, and the general effectiveness of efforts to
date.68 This top-down, technically focused regime may ultimately have a
counterpart as the adaptation regime matures and becomes more metric-
centered, but adaptation is still likely to be addressed in a less centralized
manner.
In the long-term there might be a need for international-scale adaptation
projects, but for the foreseeable future, adaptation will consist of community-
based projects aimed at local interventions. Governmental decisions regarding
funding, designing, and implementing these projects, along with adaptation
policies more broadly, will likely be more decentralized than the decisions
regarding mitigation policies. For example, developing countries have already
complained about the slowness and bureaucracy of the centralized distribution
of adaptation funding and project implementation through the Global
AFB/PPRC.1/3 (May 26, 2010), available at http://adaptation-fund.org/system/files/
AFB.PPRC_ .1.3%20Technical%2OReview%20of/o20Project%20Concept%20AFBNIECoastal2010
ISenegal.pdf.
64. BENITO MOLLER, OXFORD INST. FOR ENERGY STUDIES, THE REFORMED FINANCIAL
MECHANISM OF THE UNFCCC 34-35 (2010).
65. Writing in 2007 when the GEF essentially held a monopoly on distributing adaptation
funding, the International Council on Human Rights complained that the "GEF's core funds have been
subject to criteria that, while sensible for mitigation activities, have little to do with adaptation." ICHRP,
CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 52. For example, to qualify for these GEF
funds, projects must contribute to "global environmental benefits," but "adaptation actions will
necessarily bring primarily local (rather than global) benefits." Id.
66. Hunter, supra note 8, at 339.




Environmental Facility (GEF), desiring more control over and involvement in
adaptation projects funded through this source.
Finally, mitigation and adaptation have different relationships to the
concept of development. Despite any rhetoric to the contrary, broad-based
climate change mitigation is often antithetical to development in the short- and
medium-terms.70 Although technologies and policies are in the pipeline to
reverse the trend, so far human history has seen a positive correlation between
social and economic development and GHG emissions. 71 Thus, mitigation
typically runs at cross-purposes to development-no country has developed
without significant reliance on processes that emit GHGs. At least for the near
term, mitigation efforts would slow development as the concept has
traditionally been understood.
Adaptation practices, on the other hand, have many similarities to
development work that is already underway. Although adaptation practices will
often require outlays of large sums of money for nonproductive assets, the costs
of adaptive practices likely outweigh the costs of harm from failure to adapt. In
this sense, investing in adaptation in the immediate term makes long-term
economic sense and helps to advance a country's social and economic
development.
An example helps elucidate how adaptation practices can contribute to
development. Climate change will slow the progress of human development by
decreasing agricultural productivity because of storm damage to seeds, changed
patterns of crop pests, and diseases.72 A government might respond to these
challenges by promoting sustainable land development-it might create topsoil
erosion reduction programs and promote crop rotations that maximize
agricultural yield. The government's efforts in this respect could be viewed as a
development project, an adaptation practice, or both. In the broad sense, the
adaptation practices are a form of economic and social development,
particularly when evaluated against the counterfactual scenario-a failure to act
and the consequent human, economic, and environmental toll of decreased
agricultural production.
Development and adaptation efforts will thus need to be mutually
69. See McGray, supra note 62 (describing three different adaptation funds to watch and
maintaining that developing countries need to have direct access to projects with less central
bureaucracy).
70. See, e.g., Seetanah Boopen & Sannassee Vinesh, On the Relationship between C02
Emissions and Economic Growth: The Mauritian Experience (Aug. 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2011 -EDiA/papers/776-Seetanah.pdf.
71. Bert Metz & Marcel Kok, Integrating Development and Climate Policies, 8 CLIMATE
POL'Y 99, 99 (2008) (noting that "[p]aradoxically, social and economic development is the very driver
of climate change").
72. See, e.g., Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, National Adaptation Programme of Action
27 (Sept. 2011), available at http://unfccc.int/essential-background/library/items/3599.php?such=j&
symbol=TLS/NAPAll%20E#beg.
73. See, e.g., Angola, National Adaptation Programme of Action 85 (2011), available at http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/agoO1.pdf.
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reinforcing as neither is likely to succeed without the other.74 This counsels
international and financial coordination of development and adaptation
programs and funding, as well as collective planning for local-level project
implementation. In other words, "pro-poor adaptation strategies cannot be
developed in isolation from wider policies aimed at reducing poverty and
overcoming inequality."75 From a purely economic perspective, directing
limited funding to human development and adaptation projects makes sense.
Describing adaptation investment in Bangladesh, the UNDP noted that
coordinating adaptation and development strategies, and directing them toward
the most marginalized communities, was compelling from a cost-benefit
perspective because the estimated return on investment in development and
protection was around three to one. In addition, notions of equity bolster the
benefit of focusing on the most marginalized group, as providing an additional
dollar of funding to the income of one of Bangladesh's poorest households
should have a higher weight from a normative, moral, and equitable standpoint
than providing an additional dollar to higher-income households.77
2. Limitations ofParsing Adaption from Mitigation
Three additional points about the distinction between adaptation and
mitigation are worth making. First, the distinctions between adaptation
practices and mitigation practices that we describe are, to some degree, overly
generalized. For example, individuals may engage in personal mitigation
efforts, and adaptation finance often occurs on an international scale. However,
the distinctions we note are broadly representative of the differences between
adaptation and mitigation practices and help conceptualize the linkages
between human rights and climate change.
Second, our framing of climate change efforts as either "adaptation"
practices or "mitigation" practices is meant to be functional, not formal. The
goal of our endeavor is not to look at a policy framework or a project and label
it as one targeted at either "mitigation" or at "adaptation." Rather, our argument
is that adaptation practices, as compared to mitigation practices, have the
potential to infringe on particular rights in particular ways, implicating unique
and corresponding human rights duties. As we will argue, on account of these
differences, human rights analysis can better address issues related to
adaptation than it can issues related to mitigation.
Third, despite the distinctive traits of adaptation and mitigation, there are
a number of areas in which it is productive to apply a human rights lens to both
adaptation and mitigation. We do not explore those areas in great detail, but we
provide a few cursory examples here. Even through the narrow frame of socio-
74. See UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at vi.
75. Id. at 176; see also WORLD BANK, ECONOMICS OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, at
xv (2010) (noting that "similar measures often promote development and adaptation," though adaptation
"cannot be development as usual").
76. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 176.
77. Id. at 176-78.
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economic rights, which have traditionally weak enforcement, human rights
require some state action to progressively realize rights. In other words, human
rights approaches do not permit pure inaction or maintenance of the status
quo.78 The ability to engage in both adaptation and mitigation practices often
correlates with socioeconomic capacity. 79 And the ability to introduce new
institutional or governmental actors to improve the efficiency of
decisionmaking practices80 raises similar issues (which likely require similar
responses) to the procedures through which mitigative and adaptive responses
can themselves be incorporated into climate change regimes.81 Our thesis
retains force despite these overlaps because there are several reasons why a
human rights framework is more compelling when applied to adaptation than it
is when applied to mitigation.
C. Adaptation to Climate Change: International Efforts Underway
With these distinctions between mitigation and adaptation in mind, we
now describe international efforts to finance adaptation programs and projects
to date, as well as local projects needed-and those currently underway-to
adapt to climate change. Such an analysis is particularly important in light of
the realization that the costs of adapting to large-scale climate change will be
significant. The World Bank recently estimated that the cost of adapting to
climate change in developing countries will be $75-$ 100 billion per year for the
period 2010 to 2050.82 In Africa, for example, toward the end of the twenty-
first century, the cost of adaptation across the continent could amount to five to
ten percent of GDP. 83 Hence, at all levels, from the international level to the
community level, those persons providing and receiving funding should
prioritize their investments in adaptation practices.
78. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 2, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (imposing a duty on a State Party to take steps "to the
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means"), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/54/2510070.pdf.
79. See, e.g., Mohan Munasinghe, Env't Directorate/Dev. Co-operation Directorate, Working
Party on Global and Structural Policies/Working Party on Development Co-operation & Env't, Org. for
Econ. Co-operation & Dev't, Analysing the Nexus of Sustainable Development and Climate Change: An
Overview 3.3-3.4 (noting that the availability and distribution of economic resources affect countries'
abilities to mitigate and adapt to climate change).
80. See Hunter, supra note 8, at 354-58, 360.
81. See ICHRP, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 20-21.
82. See MARTIN PARRY ET AL., ASSESSING THE COSTS OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE:
A REVIEW OF THE UNFCC AND OTHER RECENT ESTIMATES 8, 14-16 (2009), available at
http://www.iied.org/ pubs/pdfs/1 1 50IIED.pdf (concluding that a previous study that estimated the costs
of adaptation at $49-$171 billion per year by 2030 was "optimistic," resulted in "under-estimation," and
likely "omitted" costs that could be "very substantial"); WORLD BANK, THE COSTS TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES OF ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: NEW METHODS AND ESTIMATES: CONSULTATION
DRAFT 1 (2010), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTCC/Resources/EACC-
june2010.pdf (assuming a world that is approximately two degrees warmer). See generally EUROPEAN
ENVTL. AGENCY, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE COST OF INACTION AND THE COST OF ADAPTATION (2007)
(discussing the cost of adaptation with a particular focus on methodological issues), available at
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/technicalreport 2007_13/at_download/file.
83. IPCC, SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
2012]1 325
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 37: 309
The IPCC describes brick-and-mortar projects to address the impacts of
climate change-for example sea walls-as "adaptation practices," a term we
use throughout this Article.84 In addition, "changes in decision environments"
that might make development projects downstream more resilient to climate
risks are a policy component of adaptive response and also included in the
definition of adaptation practices. Adaptation practices can anticipate an
expected, but as yet unrealized, level of climate change (proactive adaptation
practices), or they can respond to an already-realized level of climate change
that is affecting human communities or biological or geographic systems
(reactive adaptation practices). Examples of proactive projects are crop and
livelihood diversification, famine early-warning systems, and water storage
86creation projects. Reactive adaptation practices include emergency response,
post-disaster recovery, and relocation efforts.87
The range of adaptation practices is thus incredibly broad, and the ability
of an individual or community ability to engage in adaptation practices varies
widely. The capability to engage in an adaptive response is often discussed in
terms of "adaptive capacity," which the IPCC defines as "the ability or
potential of a system to respond successfully to climate variability and change,
and includes adjustments in both behavior and in resources and technologies."
Adaptive capacity is a necessary precondition for designing and implementing
effective adaptation strategies to reduce the likelihood and magnitude of
harmful climate change-induced outcomes.89
A snapshot of internationally funded adaptation practices underway is
important for our argument. Those projects are enabling states to adapt to
climate change and reduce potential human rights infringements resulting from
climate change. 90 Further, complaints relating to allocation processes, or any
particular action, inaction, or failed action in these projects, may give rise to
human rights claims related to adaptation practices.
Structurally, adaptation has played an increasingly prominent role in
international negotiations and agreements on climate change. Several of the
provisions of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC)-the international treaty resulting from the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development-address adaptation. Article IV,
for example, requires parties to "[c]ooperate in preparing for adaptation to the
impacts of climate change."9' Adaptation has also become a more prominent
84. IPCC, ADAPTATION REPORT, supra note 28, at 720.
85. Id. Climate risk screening guidelines provide an example of such a change in decision
environment. Id.
86. Id. at 721.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 727.
89. Id.
90. See infra Part III for a more detailed discussion of these human rights infringements.
91. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 51, art. IV, [ (1)(e). Article IV specifies that this cooperation
includes a commitment to "develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone
management, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas,
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issue at each Conference of the Parties (COP), the annual meeting among the
UNFCCC members that has taken place since the UNFCCC entered into force
in 1994. For example, Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol-the principal update to
the UNFCCC, which was created at COP 3 in 1997 and commits the signatories
to GHG emissions reductions-requires reserving a share of proceeds of the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for assisting developing countries with
the costs of adaptation.92 In the fifteen years since COP 3, parties have made
significant progress in advancing adaptation efforts among industrialized
nations (known as Annex I countries) and non-Annex I developing countries.93
At COP 16 in Cancfin in 2010, the parties established the Canc6n Adaptation
Framework, which includes mechanisms for non-Annex I countries to create
adaptation plans, a sixteen-member Adaptation Committee to promote the
implementation of adaptation practices, and a work program to weigh
approaches for addressing loss and damages resulting from climate change. 94
Most recently, at COP 17 in Durban, the parties launched the Adaptation
Committee, which will meet for the first time in 2012. The Committee holds
the potential to generate significant expertise and develop soft regulation
through, for example, norm creation and peer marketing. 95 Despite nearly
failing to do so, 96 the parties at COP 17 also launched the Green Climate Fund
(also sometimes referred to as the "Green Fund"), which will oversee some of
the $100 billion that developed countries have promised to make available by
2020, to cut GHG emissions and adapt to climate change.97
particularly in Africa, affected by drought and desertification, as well as floods." Id. Article III uses the
language of adaptation in declaring that "the parties . . . should promote . . . sustainable economic
growth and development in . . . developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the
problems of climate change." Id. art. III, 5.
92. Id. art. XII, 8.
93. At COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, negotiators were unable to agree to an updated
approach to adaptation. Annex I countries generally preferred a "framework" to support collaboration
while leaving the details of financing to the Parties, but non-Annex I countries preferred an adaptation
"program" that would define clearly what adaptation activities the fund would support and the specific
sources of funding. See McGray, supra note 62. However, Copenhagen was not a complete failure in
terms of adaptation because the Copenhagen Accord included adaptation more prominently than did
previous climate change agreements. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Conference of the Parties, 15th Sess., Report of the Conference: Copenhagen Accord, IT 1, 3, 8, 10-11,
Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-19, 2009, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Mar. 30, 2010).
94. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Draft Resolution, Outcome of
the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention,
Cancin, Mex., Nov. 29-Dec. 10, 2010, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLGA/2010/6.7 (Dec. 10, 2010).
95. See Nathan Hultman, Remarks at The Brookings Institution Conference on Climate
Change Adaptation in a Post-Durban World 26 (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://
www.brookings.edu/events/2012/0106_climatechangeadaptation.aspx.
96. See Alex Morales & Kim Chipman, UN's $100 Billion Green Climate Fund Stalled by
U.S., Saudi Arabia, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 1, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201 1-11-
30/u-s-says-un-green-climate-fund-needs-small-changes-in-structure.html (noting the "raise[d] ... risk
that the [Green Climate Fund] won't be finished in time for the Dec. 9 conclusion of the UN global
warming talks in Durban").
97. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 18. 2011,
Rep. of the Transitional Committee for the Design of the Green Climate Fund, Note by the Co-Chairs of
the Transitional Committee, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/6, available at http://unfccc.int/files/
meetings/durban nov 2011 /decisions/application/pdf/copl 7_gcf.pdf.
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Funds for adaptation are currently available both inside and outside the
UNFCCC context. The main funders behind the current adaptation funds are
international donors whose donations are channeled through bilateral agencies
or multilateral institutions,98 the most important of which are the Adaptation
Fund, the Global Environment Facility, and the World Bank. 99 The Adaptation
Fund in particular may become a key funding organization in coming years.
Although it has taken a long time for the Fund to begin financing projects, 00 it
could become particularly important because it financially supports adaptation
practices through a two-percent levy on the CDM, which could raise $400-
$600 million in the medium term for adaptation practices.'01
While local or piecemeal adaptation practices have been in progress for a
number of years, adaptation projects supported by the funds mentioned above
have been implemented only quite recently. For example, in June 2010 the
Adaptation Fund board approved the first proposals for "concrete adaptation
projects," totaling $21.8 million. The Fund's projects include one by a
"national implementing entity," which fits into a category of projects awarded
directly to implementing states and intended to facilitate access to the funds and
thereby to avoid the perceived delays for which the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) has been criticized.102 The Fund chose four projects to finance:
reducing risks and vulnerabilities from glacier lake outburst floods in northern
Pakistan;103 protecting people, dwellings, and farmlands from coastal erosion
98. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE
CHANGE 262 (2010), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2010/Resources/
5287678-1226014527953/WDRIO-Full-Text.pdf.
99. Benito Muller, No Trust Without Respect: Adaptation Quick Start Funding at the Cross
Road, OXFORD INST. FOR ENERGY STuD., at 3 (Mar. 2010), available at
http://www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/documents/comment_01_03_10.pdf. The Global
Environment Facility is, perhaps, the third adaptation fund to watch since it is the traditional repository
of funds associated with the UNFCCC. McGray, supra note 62.
100. Established under the Kyoto Protocol, the fund was conceived at COP 4 in Buenos Aires,
where the parties decided to implement "adaptation response measures." United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Review of the Implementation of Commitments and of Other Provisions
of the Convention, Decision II, 1(a), Buenos Aires, Arg., Nov. 2-14, 1998, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.l. This led to COP 6 and 7, which in turn created the Adaptation Fund. See
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on its
Fourth Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Fourth Session, at 4,
Bonn, Ger., July 16-27, 2001, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/L.7; United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, at 52, Marrakesh,
Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 9,2001, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1.
101. WORLD BANK, supra note 98, at 262-63. Moreover, at COP 15 the parties pledged to
establish "[n]ew multilateral funding for adaptation . . . through effective and efficient fund
arrangements." United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen Accord, 1 8,
Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-18, 2009, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7. At COP 16, the parties continued
this goal of adaptation financing as part of the Cancun Adaptation Framework, but again provided no
adaptation-specific funding target. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term Cooperative Action under the
Convention, Draft Decision, T 11-35, Canc6n, Mex., Nov. 29-Dec. 10, 2010, U.N. Doc.
FCC/AWGLGA/2010/L.7.
102. The Adaptation Fund Board Approves Adaptation Project Concepts for Financing,
ADAPTATION FUND (June 24, 2010), http://adaptation-fund.org/node/561; see McGray, supra note 62.
103. Adaptation Fund, Project/Programme Proposal for Pakistan, Doc. No. AFB/PPRC.1/8
(June 2, 2010).
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and salination in fragile rice-growing areas in Senegal; building institutional
capacity for water resource management and reducing risks and vulnerabilities
from floods and droughts in a flood-prone watershed in rural Nicaragua; o0 and
enhancing the ability of communities to adapt to temperature and rainfall
changes' adverse effects on the agricultural sector and food security in the
Solomon Islands.1os
These Adaptation Fund projects are similar to other adaptation projects
sponsored by various financing mechanisms and organizations. In Bangladesh,
for example, local and foreign NGOs, funded in part through the Canadian
International Development Agency, have engaged in projects assisting
freshwater shrimp farmers to adopt more saline-resistant crab farming because
saltwater intrusion has affected farmers' ability to raise shrimp.107 The
government in Nepal, assisted by international donors, has taken proactive
steps to reduce the risk of a catastrophic glacial lake outburst flood from a lake
that is rising because of glacial retreat by creating a channel in the dam and
lowering the level of the lake. os An often-cited example of proactive
adaptation in the developed world is the construction of the Deer Island Bridge
in Canada, which was redesigned and built higher than currently necessary to
accommodate sea level rise over the one-hundred-year lifespan of the bridge.109
Any one of these types of projects could potentially influence individuals'
rights at the planning, implementation, or execution stages, and it is for this
reason that we must be cognizant of the human rights implications of
adaptation practices. 0
We now turn to a general overview of the human rights implications of
climate change, particularly for the world's most vulnerable citizens, before
articulating why human rights can and should illuminate adaptation programs.
III. CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
With an ever-increasing body of evidence on the mounting and likely
discriminatory toll of climate change, private and public actors have worked in
recent years to bring insights from human rights law to bear on the problem of
climate change. Such a human rights framework holds particular normative
appeal given that persons already vulnerable to human rights infringements
based on factors such as poverty, geography, gender, ethnicity, disability, and
age will likely also suffer the most deleterious climate change consequences.
104. Adaptation Fund, Project/Programme Proposal for Senegal, Doc. No. AFB/PPRC.1/3
(May 26, 2010).
105. Adaptation Fund, Project/Programme Proposal for Nicaragua, Doc. No. AFB/PPRC.1/7
(May 26, 2010).
106. Adaptation Fund, Project/Programme Proposal for Solomon Islands, Doc. No.
AFB/PPRC.1/9 (May 26, 2010).
107. Jennifer Pouliotte et al., Livelihoods in Rural Bangladesh, 59 TIEMPO 18, 20-21 (2006).
108. IPCC, ADAPTATION REPORT, supra note 28, at 723.
109. Id. at 724.
110. For a discussion of human rights that may be implicated by states' adaptation responses, or
lack thereof, see infra notes 122-145 and accompanying text.
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As we explain below, some commentators debate the wisdom of applying a
human rights framework to climate change, or at least debate the practical
utility of such an effort given the costs of and political resistance to many
efforts to address climate change." I Nevertheless, we find the arguments for
applying a human rights framework to climate change more powerful-and less
easily criticized on political grounds-when focusing on adaptation rather than
mitigation.
Thus, in advancing our claim that a human rights approach can improve
the understanding of and response to the need for climate change adaptation,
we use this Part to provide a brief background on the linkage between human
rights and climate change more generally. Conceptualizing climate change
from a human rights perspective requires focusing on those people who will
suffer the most from a changing climate, with a long-term goal of creating the
. - *112political will to address large-scale injustice.
Our description of how adaptation implicates human rights builds from
the wealth of scholarship that has connected environmental protection to human
rights, as well as from efforts to establish a right to a clean and healthy
environment. The core international human rights treatiesll4 do not provide
for an express right to a safe and healthy environment. Nonetheless, there is
international consensus that a clean and healthy environment can impact
persons' rights.116 Moreover, the UN human rights treaty bodies all recognize
111. See supra Section III.C.
112. See Hunter, supra note 8, at 332.
113. Mclnemey-Lankford, supra note 55, at 431-32; see U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child art. 24, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (signed but not yet ratified by the United States)
[hereinafter CRC]; Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries
arts. 4, 7, 15, June 27, 1989, Int'l Labour Conference, 28 I.L.M. 1382; Additional Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11,
adopted Nov. 17, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 156; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 24, June 27,
1981, 21 I.L.M. 58; HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES To ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Alan E. Boyle &
Michael R. Anderson eds., 1996); LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Romina Picolotti
& Jorge Daniel Taillant eds., 2003); John Lee, The Underlying Legal Theory To Support a Well-Defined
Human Right to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law, 25 COLUM. J.
ENVTL L. 283 (2000); Dominic McGoldrick, Sustainable Development and Human Rights: An
Integrated Conception, 45 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 796 (1996).
114. There are nine core international human rights treaties: (i) International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 UNT.S. 195 [hereinafter
ICERD]; (ii) ICESCR, supra note 78; (iii) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; (iv) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Sept. 30, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; (v)
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10,
1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]; (vi) CRC, supra note
113; (vii) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3; (viii) Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRPD]; and (ix) International Convention
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res A/RES/61/177, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/RES/2006/1 (Dec. 20, 2006); see OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 18-19 (2010).
115. OHCHR Report, supra note 9, 18.
116. The Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (the
"Stockholm Declaration") provides that persons have the right to "adequate conditions of life, in an
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being." United Nations Conference on
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an intrinsic connection between protecting the environment and fulfilling a
wide spectrum of human rights, such as the rights to life, health, water, food,
and housing.' For example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child calls on
state parties to take appropriate measures to combat disease and malnutrition by
providing adequate food and clean drinking water, while taking into account
the dangers and risks that environmental pollution poses to such endeavors.
Aside from their normative appeal in this context, human rights have prompted
action in the environmental protection arena and, more recently, in the climate
change arena.
A. Human Rights Implicated by the Effects of Climate Change
Earlier in the Article, we outlined the exacting and unequivocal human
toll of climate change: disease, food shortages, water scarcity, displacement of
persons from their homes and communities, and potentially the loss of life,
dignity, personhood, and self-determination.119 International human rights law
speaks resonantly about such harms, bestowing global citizens with legal rights
in this respect and nation-states with legal duties to fulfill these rights.
Although we will later discuss the usefulness of employing human rights to
address these harms,120 here we briefly outline a nonexhaustive list of the
variety of interrelated human rights that climate change implicates. Under
international law all human rights-whether civil-political rights such as the
rights to life and equality before the law; socioeconomic rights such as the
rights to health, water, education, and work; or collective rights such as the
right to development-are indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated.121
First, climate change poses risks to the human right to life as a result of
mounting global natural catastrophes.122 A variety of international treaties and
covenants safeguard the right to life.123 The Stern Review, a formative study
examining the economics of climate change, found that climate change will
the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, princ. 1, Declaration of the United
Nations on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973). The Declaration of the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the "Rio Declaration") provides that
"[h]uman beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy
and productive life in harmony with nature." United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, princ. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter
Rio Declaration].
117. Rio Declaration, supra note 116. Note that certain regional human rights instruments, such
as the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the San Salvador Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights, do recognize the right to live in a healthy or satisfactory environment.
See id.
118. CRC, supra note 113, art. 24, 1 2(c).
119. See supra Section II.A.
120. See infra Section III.C.
121. See OHCHR Report, supra note 9, 6-7.
122. See id. 22, 24. The Report emphasized that the "[p]rotection of the right to life,
generally and in the context of climate change, is closely related to measures for the fulfillment of other
rights, such as those related to food, water, health and housing." Id. 1 24.
123. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 114, art. 6; CRC, supra note 113, art. 6.
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affect the basic elements of life for people around the world, as hundreds of
millions of persons suffer from hunger, water shortages, heat stresses, disease
burdens, and permanent displacement on account of climate change, with
particularly pronounced effects for women. 124 The right to life is considered
"basic to all human rights." 25 It is also a right that states parties must take
affirmative steps to protect. This can include efforts to reduce malnutrition,
epidemics, and infant mortality.126 Unlike certain other human rights that may
be derogated from in times of public emergency (potentially including
emergencies posed by natural disasters), the right to life is a nonderogable right
that the government must always protect.127
As climate change threatens global food supplies with irreparable
damage, with one estimate projecting that an additional 600 million persons
will suffer from malnutrition on account of climate change,128 it dramatically
implicates the right to food safeguarded under international law.129 For
example, the ICESCR provides that, with regard to persons' right to food,
states parties are required to take necessary actions to alleviate hunger
including during natural or other disasters. 130 Climate change also clearly
impacts the right to water as it may exacerbate existing burdens on limited
global water resources. It may also interact with a range of other causes of
water stress, including poverty and inequality, population growth,
environmental degradation, and poor management of water resources.
Restricted access to clean water runs afoul of the right to clean water as
codified in various international human rights instruments. 132
Climate change also threatens the right to health,133 which incorporates
underlying determinants of health including adequate food and nutrition,
housing, safe drinking water, adequate sanitation, and a healthy environment.
134
124. See Nicholas Stem, The Economics of Climate Change, in THE STERN REVIEW 563 (2007);
Press Release, Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, The Human Rights Impact of Climate
Change, Bali Climate Change Conference (Nov. 2009).
125. Human Rights Comm. General Comment 6, T 1, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/REV. 9 (Vol. 1)
(1982); General Comment No. 14, $ 1, U.N. Doc. HR1/GEN/l/REV. 9 (Vol. 1) (1984).
126. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., General Comment 6, supra note 125, 5.
127. See id.; General Comment 14, supra note 125, 1.
128. See UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 9.
129. See ICESCR, supra note 78, art. 11; CEDAW, supra note 114, art. 14, 1 (h); CRC, supra
note 113, art. 24(c); CRPD, supra note 114, arts. 25(f), 28(1); ICERD, supra note 114, art. 5(e).
130. CESCR General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food (art. 11), 6. This requirement of
State parties recently has become enforceable by individuals against states through the Optional Protocol
to the ICESCR. See discussion infra notes 276-277 and accompanying text.
131. See OHCHR Report, supra note 9, 1 29 (referring to statements in the UNDP Human
Development Report 2006).
132. See CESCR, General Comment 15, Right to Water (arts. 11 and 12), 2; CEDAW, supra
note 114, art. 14, 2(h); CRPD, supra note 114, art. 28, T 2(a); CRC, supra note 113, art. 24, 2(c).
133. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 78, art. 12; CEDAW, supra note 114, arts. 12, 14(2)(b);
ICERD, supra note 114, art. 5(e)(iv); CRC, supra note 113, art. 24; see also CESCR, General Comment
14, Right to Highest Attainable Standard of Health (art. 12). The right to health implies the enjoyment
of, and equal access to, appropriate health care services, as well as to goods, services and conditions that
enable a person to live a healthy life. CESCR, General Comment 14, Right to Highest Attainable
Standard of Health (art. 12)
134. See CESCR General Comment 12, 1 8, supra note 130.
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Poor health decreases vulnerable individuals' ability to adapt to climate change
events, making the sickest global citizens most likely to suffer the greatest
effects of climate change; from a human rights perspective, focusing on these
individuals and taking concerted steps to improve their health is a central
means of reducing the health impacts of climate change events.135
As sea-level rise and storm surges impact many coastal settlements,
individuals in those communities will confront threats to their right to adequate
housing.'36  This right is codified in several international human rights
instruments: its most comprehensive articulation is under the ICESCR, which
considers the right to adequate housing an essential element of the right to an
adequate standard of living. 37
Climate change also starkly implicates the global migration and
displacement of persons.138 As flooding threatens low-lying communities,
persons increasingly will migrate from rural to urban communities-
exacerbating the physical and resource strain on urban slums and informal
settlements, which themselves remain vulnerable to climate change.'3 9 Many
informal urban settlements are built illegally and without formal planning, and
when rural residents migrate to these informal urban areas, there is a greater
risk of disease, insufficient water, and even social unrest. 140
Lastly, in this brief overview of potential rights infringements, climate
change poses undeniable risks to persons' right to self-determination, a
fundamental principle of international law enumerated in both civil-political
and socioeconomic rights instruments.141 The right to self-determination is a
collective, group-based right. Its collective realization, however, is a
prerequisite to the fulfillment of the variety of individual human rights
guaranteed under international treaties and covenants.142
While the aforementioned rights violations will be cross-cutting in their
135. See id. f 32-33.
136. See OHCHR Report, supra note 9, 1 36 (citing data from CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 333 (2007)).
137. See id.; ICESCR, supra note 114, art. 11; see also CEDAW, supra note 114, art. 14, 2;
CRC, supra note 114, art. 27, 1 3; ICERD, supra note 114, art. 5(e)(iii); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, art. 25, 1 1.
138. See Docherty & Giannini, supra note 13, at 349 (articulating a model for an international
convention to address the challenge of climate change refugees before the situation reaches a crisis
stage).
139. See OHCHR Report, supra note 9, 36-37. As of early 2009, an estimated one billion
persons were living in urban slums on unstable hillside terrains or riverbanks vulnerable to flooding. See
id. (citing UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 9).
140. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 41, at 202.
141. Common Article 1, Paragraph 1, of the ICESCR and the ICCPR establish the right of self-
determination, by which people may "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development." ICESCR, supra note 114, art. 1(1); ICCPR, supra note 114,
art. 1(1). The right to self-determination is also contained in Articles I and 55 of the Charter of the
United Nations, and also contained in the Declaration on the Right to Development, art. 1, 1 2, and the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, arts. 3 and 4. OHCHR Report, supra
note 9, at 939 n.60.
142. See OHCHR Report, supra note 9, 1 39.
2012] 333
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 37: 309
effect, there is little doubt that the most dramatic effects of climate change will
be borne by persons who are vulnerable due to factors like poverty, gender,
age, minority status, and disability.143 International human rights law mandates
that States address such vulnerabilities in accordance with the principle of
equality and nondiscrimination. Specialized human rights treaties like the
CRC and the CEDAW specifically focus on the needs of disadvantaged,
marginalized, and vulnerable groups and thereby privilege these groups with
focused consideration. 145
Recently, international actors have formally recognized the relationship
between climate change and human rights. This connection has been
increasingly acknowledged in diplomatic, nongovernmental, and academic
efforts analyzing the effects of a changing climate.'" For example, in March
2008, the UN Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 7/23, which was the
first UN resolution to recognize that climate change poses an immediate threat
to people and communities around the world and has significant implications
for the enjoyment of human rights.147 Although this may have stated the
obvious,148 this recognition from the Human Rights Council was an important
step in making concrete the connection between climate change and human
rights. The resolution called on the OHCHR to prepare a "detailed analytical
study on the relationship between climate change and human rights." 49 The
OHCHR released its study in January 2009.1 Focusing on the implications of
climate change for the enjoyment of a number of specific rights, such as the
rights to life, health, water, food, housing, and the right to self-determination,' 5'
as well as the implications for vulnerable people such as women and
indigenous people,152 the report demonstrated the Human Rights Council's
intention to ensure that UN human rights institutions remain a critical part of
143. See id. 42.
144. See id.
145. Note, however, that the United States, the world's largest GHG emitter, is one of only two
states (the other is Somalia) that has not ratified either treaty. See Office of the United Nations High
Comm'r for Human Rights, Status of Ratification of Human Rights Instruments (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/treaty/docs/HRChart.xls.
146. Male' Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change, adopted Nov. 14,
2007, available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/MaleDeclarationNov07.pdf, Knox, Climate
Change, supra note 8, at 477. Marc Limon has summarized other analytical steps to articulate the link
between climate change and human rights taken by, inter alia, the Maldives and other small island states,
the International Council on Human Rights Policy, the Organization of American States, Oxfam
International, Mary Robinson's Realizing Rights, Kofi Annan's Global Humanitarian Forum, and the
UNDP. Limon, supra note 55, at 442-43. The United Kingdom has gone as far as suggesting an
international agreement to address specifically the human rights components of climate change.
Submission of the United Kingdom to the OHCHR under Human Rights Council Res. 7/23, at 3 (2008)
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/climatechange/docs/submissionsfUK.pdf [hereinafter United
Kingdom Res. 7/23 Submission].
147. U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 7/23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/78 (Mar. 28, 2008).
148. Limon, supra note 55, at 444.
149. U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 147.
150. See OHCHR Report, supra note 9.
151. Id. T 20-41.
152. Id. TI 45-54.
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the climate change debate and solution.'5 3
With its bold pronouncements about the multiple human rights
implications of climate change, the OHCHR Report "mark[ed] a definitive
break with arguments about whether there is indeed a relationship between
climate change and human rights."' 54 Instead, the Report pointed to "a new
debate on the implications of and necessary responses to that relationship." 55
Because climate change indirectly undermines human rights through
environmental degradation, the OHCHR Report addresses the analytical gap
caused by the lack of an express right to a healthy environment. It does this by
drawing on the Stockholm Declaration, which "reflects a general recognition of
the interdependence and interrelatedness of human rights and the environment,"
as well as the analytical fact that "United Nations human rights treaty bodies
recognize the intrinsic link between the environment and the realization of a
range of human rights."15
Yet, despite its many triumphs and breakthroughs, the OHCHR Report,
like most analyses of climate change to date, provided only a cursory
discussion of the ways in which adaptation to climate change is implicated by,
and in turn impacts, human rights. The Report noted that "[i]rrespective of the
scale of mitigation measures taken today and over the next decades, global
warming will continue due to the inertia of the climate system and the long-
term effects of previous greenhouse gas emissions. Consequently, adaptation
measures are required to enable societies to cope with the effects of now
unavoidable global warming." 5 7 While representing a step in the right
direction, the Report fell short of examining the nuanced ways in which
adaptation can and should benefit from a human rights approach and
considering how human rights can provide leverage in responding to adaptive
needs. It also failed to explore deeply how climate change adaptation raises
significant issues of equity, since the most disadvantaged global citizens stand
to suffer the greatest consequences from climate change.
B. Adaptation Apartheid: Climate Change in the Developing World
Adaptation-much like other persistent issues in environmental
justice'"-will often be an intensely local and even personal phenomenon.
Within even the poorest countries, there will be elites who possess the
resources to adapt; of course there will also be individuals in even the richest
153. Hunter, supra note 8, at 338.
154. Limon, supra note 55, at 445.
155. Id.; see also ICHRP, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 1 (claiming
that "few dispute" that "climate change is already undermining the realization of a broad range of
internationally protected human rights").
156. OHCHR Report, supra note 9, 11 6-7; see also Limon, supra note 55, at 446.
157. OHCRH Report, supra note 9, 15.
158. See PAUL HAWKEN, BLESSED UNREST: HOW THE LARGEST MOVEMENT IN THE WORLD
CAME INTO BEING AND WHY No ONE SAW IT COMING 256 (2007).
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societies who have insufficient capacity to adapt to climate change.15 Yet
generally speaking, adaptive capacity tends to correlate with general capacity
on regional, national, local, group, and individual levels. In this respect, climate
change's consequences for human health, security, and stability are particularly
grave for developing countries and their residents because of these countries'
geographic characteristics, already-low incomes, and heightened reliance on
sectors sensitive to climate change such as agriculture. 160
Residents of already vulnerable regions and communities confront a
range of stresses that affect their sensitivity to climate change events as well as
their ability to adapt. These stresses include poverty, inadequate access to
basic resources, food and water insecurity, high incidences of diseases such as
HIV/AIDS, and conflict. 16 2 Within a particular region, there is significant risk
of "adaptation apartheid" for groups with diminished adaptive capacities.
Empirical work has demonstrated that in addition to disparities in climate
change vulnerability, access to resources that correlate with adaptive capacity
can be distributed unevenly along the lines of age, class, ethnicity, gender, and
religion.163 Poverty, inequality, power imbalances, and discrimination make
certain groups particularly vulnerable to interrelated human rights
infringements from climate change. 1  Women, children, the elderly, those in
rural areas, internally displaced persons, disabled persons, ethnic minorities,
persons lacking access to healthcare and to health pre-determinants such as
water and sanitation, and poor persons already living at the margins of survival
will likely suffer disproportionate impacts of climate change and thus more
severe human rights infringements. 165
In the analysis below, we focus on sub-Saharan Africa and its women,
providing a cross-cutting lens into how climate change profoundly threatens
certain regions', groups', and individuals' human rights, creating an ever-
present risk of adaptation apartheid. We could have focused on many other
regions, groups, and peoples already suffering discrimination in the fulfillment
of their human rights and who stand to suffer even more pronounced
consequences due to climate change.166
As one particularly poignant example of disparate adaptive capacity at the
159. IPCC, ADAPTATION REPORT,supra note 28, at 719.
160. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 41.
161. See CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 19 (2007)
available at http:// www.ipcc.ch/pdflassessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf.
162. See id.
163. See Press Release, Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, supra note 124.
164. Id.
165. See id. For example, elderly persons can suffer pronounced impacts from climate change-
related events like heat stress and malnutrition. They also may be particularly vulnerable if they have to
travel long distances to access health care. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 41, at 203.
166. The Pacific islands and Caribbean islands provide two more powerful examples of regions
likely to be hardest hit by climate change, amplifying their already relatively low levels of development.
See INST. OF DEV. STUD., OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS: MAINSTREAMING CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IT 5.1-5.2 (2006).
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regional level, sub-Saharan Africa already confronts significant human
consequences from climate change. Sub-Saharan Africa produces less than four
percent of GHG emissions; yet, the region already experiences effects of
changing weather and rainfall patterns, food and water scarcity, and internal
displacement of persons, among other impacts, and it can expect more
deleterious consequences in years to come." In 2011, a devastating drought hit
the Horn of Africa, affecting eleven countries and twelve million persons. 68
Droughts have had especially disastrous human consequences for residents of
sub-Saharan Africa; the drought beginning in the Sahel in the late-1960s killed
more than 100,000 people and effectively demolished farming economies.' 69
The Sahel and Africa's other dry areas can expect to experience more drought
in upcoming years.170 With a third of persons in Africa already residing in
drought-prone regions, by one estimate, additional climate alteration may put
another 75 to 250 million persons' lives at risk.'7' Moreover, areas in sub-
Saharan Africa already prone to floods may experience more frequent flooding
due to changing rainfall patterns.172 In responding to droughts and floods alike,
governments and donors will have to divert limited resources from regional and
national development projects to emergency relief projects. 73
The increased variability in climate will, in turn, lower food production in
sub-Saharan Africa. The region heavily relies on agriculture for household
income and livelihood, and climatic conditions greatly affect agricultural
output. As one commentator has predicted, climate change "could mean
disaster on a continent where 70 per cent of workers are employed on farms
and farming is often the engine for national economies-generating export
earnings and inexpensive food."174
Significantly, residents of the sub-Saharan region have diminished
adaptive capacity to respond to such shocks. They often have crops that are less
diverse and resilient, a heavy reliance on rain-fed irrigation, and limited money
and expertise to cope with damaging changes by modifying their agricultural
techniques.175 In sub-Saharan Africa, the staple crops such as maize and millet
have a strong association with year-to-year climate variability. 17 One NGO,
167. See Michael Fleshman, Climate Change and Africa: Stormy Weather Ahead, AFRICA
RENEWAL, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/newrels/climate-change-
1.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
168. See Climate Change Brings Opportunity Alongside Challenges for Africa, WORLD BANK
(Nov. 21, 2011), http://climatechange.worldbank.org/content/climate-change-brings-opportunity-
alongside-challenges-africa.
169. BURROUGHS, supra note 43, at 131.





175. See BURROUGHS, supra note 43, at 132; Jouna Paavola, Justice in Adaptation to Climate
Change in Tanzania, in FAIRNESS IN ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 201-02 (2006).
176. See Eco-Watch Africa, Submission to U.N. Comm'n on the Status of Women, Emerging
Issues Panel: Gender Perspectives on Climate Change, at 2-3 (Feb. 25-Mar. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Eco-
Watch Africa].
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Eco-Watch Africa, expects productivity in harvesting such staple crops in
southern Africa to drop by twenty to fifty percent in years with extreme climate
conditions, creating food shortages.177 In aggregate, Eco-Watch Africa predicts
that in sub-Saharan Africa, farmers will harvest as little as fifty percent of their
current yields by 2080.178
The consequences for women will be particularly dramatic. Although the
nature of women's vulnerability varies considerably, existing patterns of
inequality and vulnerability will be exacerbated by the effects of climate
change.' 79 Many poor women already suffer from restrictions on their rights,
access to resources, mobility, and voice in making decisions that impact their
lives.180 For instance, women in Africa are the main producers of climate-
sensitive staple crops. 1 Women are also often the last to receive food and
other household resources.182 Hence, food shortages not only infringe women's
right to food, but climate change-induced food shortages will in turn increase
women's daily workload as women struggle to ensure food security. As
women's daily workload increases, women will have diminished opportunities
for other educational, economic, social, and political engagement. In this sense,
climate change magnifies the range of various human rights infringements to
which women are already vulnerable.
Water shortages will also have a disproportionate, compounded effect on
women. In the developing world women generally bear the responsibility for
the time-consuming task of gathering and transporting water. 183 According to
one study, women performed ninety-one percent of the work in fetching water
for domestic consumption in a Zimbabwean household.184 As water becomes
scarcer, women will have to travel farther distances to search for it. 185 One
study found that women in developing countries already spend an average of
134 minutes per day collecting water for their households.186 In aggregate,
women in sub-Saharan Africa spend an estimated 40 billion hours per year
collecting water-an amount equal to a year's worth of labor by France's
workforce. In urban areas that suffer from water scarcity, women and girls
will likely spend more time queuing to access intermittent and limited water
supplies.'8 When women must walk farther to secure water for their
household, they become more likely to drop out of school and experience a
177. See id. at 4.
178. See id. at 3.
179. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, RESOURCE GUIDE ON GENDER AND CLIMATE CHANGE, at iii,
U.N. Sales No. S.08.111.B.22 (2009).
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See Eco-Watch Africa, supra note 176, at 2-3.




187. See U.N. DEv. PROGRAM, supra note 183, at iii.
188. See Eco-Watch Africa, supra note 176, at 2-4.
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reduction in other opportunities for activities that would empower them.189
Climate change also will have a significant effect on individual health in
developing countries, since diarrhea, respiratory diseases, and a range of
illnesses are expected to increase, as are related deaths.'9 Again, for a range of
complex and interrelated reasons, women are particularly at risk of having their
right to health infringed. For example, since women and girls play a more
significant role in performing household chores and collecting water than do
men and boys, they are also more susceptible to water-borne diseases such as
diarrhea and cholera, which are likely to increase on account of climate
change. 191
Gender also plays a prominent role in migration behaviors in the sub-
Saharan Africa region. Gender dynamics are particularly pronounced in
household migration from rural to urban areas. 192 Men will often move to urban
areas to seek out other work, while women remain behind in strained rural
settings, managing a heightened set of responsibilities for producing food and
caring for the household and children.'93 As a consequence of this heightened
burden, women may be further deprived of education, employment, political
participation, and other activities that international human rights law guarantees
to them.
We briefly highlight these two lenses-the sub-Saharan Africa regional
lens and a gendered lens-to show the potentially disproportionate impacts of
climate change on certain groups of individuals, who are also likely to be least
adaptive to change. Effective adaptive policies must understand regional and
group disparities-for example, they should recognize intra-household
dynamics and how gender influences accessibility to a range of interrelated and
interdependent rights.194 Adaptive policies that ignore these realities-for
example, by distributing adaptation funding exclusively to male leaders in a
community-will likely only reinforce at least some of the disparities in
adaptive capacity.195 In contrast, adaptation funding that is spent wisely and in
a manner sensitive to status and capacity disparities can help mitigate
discriminatory impacts of climate change-and may help alleviate
discrimination more widely. In the case of distributing adaptation funding,
donors and governments can purposefully target women with their funding,
also ensuring that women have a voice in designing adaptation programs that
meet their needs. Communications technologies may play an important role in
promoting equity in expenditures of adaptation funding-such technologies can
189. See id. at 4.
190. Jenkins, supra note 43; see WORLD BANK, CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGY REPORT:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 7, 10, 53 (2010).
191. See Eco-Watch Africa, supra note 176, at 5.
192. See id. at 6.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 2-3.
195. See generally IPCC, ADAPTATION REPORT, supra note 28, at 731 (explaining that "[s]ome
adaptations that address changing economic and social conditions may increase vulnerability to climate
change, just as adaptations to climate change may increase vulnerabilities to other changes").
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track and report on how specific funding is being used. On a more pragmatic
level, communications tools may help ensure more reliable and predictable
access to limited water resources. The World Bank has started funding a range
of tools that help women and communities better manage their water resources,
including open data platforms, sensors, and mobile phones that can
communicate quotas of irrigation water that farmers can use for a particular
day. To the extent that these tools help communities ensure a more reliable
and predictable supply of water, and save time in the process, they will have a
disproportionately positive impact on many women, enabling them to pursue
other activities. Indeed, adaptation funding can play a critical role in narrowing
or expanding the range of human rights that particular persons or groups
enjoy-further reason to discuss adaptation, at least in part, using the language
of human rights.
C. Applying Human Rights to Climate Change: Theory and Practice
In light of the disproportionate impact of climate change on vulnerable
groups such as women, human rights can serve as a pragmatic and powerful
tool to vindicate rights. After all, human rights analysis focuses particularly on
the most disadvantaged persons and their needs. As a legal and practical matter,
human rights can hold state actors accountable. Human rights are legal rights
codified in a range of legal instruments at the international, regional or national
level. In the case of the United Nations international human rights treaties,
these instruments establish legal duties of states that are enforceable by
individuals, groups of individuals, and their representatives before international
tribunals.197 Each UN treaty has a monitoring system that allows for review of
ratifying state actions on a periodic basis and, where necessary, a call for a
State party to change its laws, policies and programs in order to fulfill its legal
obligations.198 Each UN treaty also has a treaty monitoring body that consists
of a panel of independent experts with the mandates to monitor government
efforts to fulfill the rights guaranteed under the treaty; to clarify and interpret
rights under the treaty by offering general comments or recommendations; and,
in certain instances, to review complaints from individuals or groups within a
particular state that allege certain rights violations. Given the formal legal
means for reviewing states' actions, persons concerned about and impacted by
climate change-including those in vulnerable states, nongovernmental
organizations, and indigenous groups-should consider using human rights to
bolster their cause.' 99
An example helps elucidate how the human rights reporting system works
in practice. The formative legal challenge addressing the human rights
196. See WORLD BANK, supra note 168.
197. See Knox, Climate Change, supra note 8, at 166.
198. See wORLD HEALTH ORG., WOMEN's HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: MONITORING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF CEDAW 2-3 (2007).
199. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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consequences of climate change was the 2005 petition to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights by a group of Inuit from the United States and
Canada who alleged that the failure to reduce GHG emissions violated their
human rights. The petition, filed on behalf of all Inuit from the United States
and Canada, alleged that global warming infringed on many of the Inuit's
rights, including the right to enjoy the benefits of their culture, the right to
traditional lands, the right to prosperity, the right to health, the right to life, the
right to physical integrity, and the right to security.201 The Commission
reviewed the Inuit's petition, ultimately rejecting it without prejudice.
However, the Commission subsequently invited the Inuit group to provide
testimony on the connections between climate change and human rights. 202
Since the Inuit petition, small island states have used various fora in the UN
legal system to elucidate the connection between climate change and human
203rights and have invoked human rights language in UNFCCC negotiations.
There are several prominent reasons why it is normatively and legally
desirable to apply a human rights framework to climate change. First, climate
change is an international problem with human consequences that are likely to
unfold on an international scale, and to require international solutions, making
international law an appropriate means of promoting accountability for climate
change. Second, climate change will result in infringements of human rights, so
it makes normative sense to consider climate change via a human rights
framework. Third, as a practical matter, human rights law provides a
framework in which tribunals have a history of balancing human needs with
limited government resources. Fourth, the human rights framework already
includes tools for monitoring and enforcement. Fifth, human rights law may
encourage coherence in adaptation policy, or international standards for
adaptation practices at multiple levels.
Yet there are well-documented challenges to making human rights have
practical significance in the lives of the persons they are meant to protect.
There is widespread skepticism about the efficacy of human rights treaties and
instruments.204 Critics point to substantive and procedural weaknesses in
human rights treaties that undermine their effectiveness. First, most
international treaties contain substantive provisions-limitation clauses that
200. See IAC, Inuit Petition, supra note 7, at 70. In 2007, the UN Security Council addressed
climate change for the first time. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Holds First-Ever
Debate on Impact of Climate Change on Peace, Security, Hearing Over 50 Speakers; Some Delegations
Raise Doubts Regarding Council's Role on Issue, While Others, Particularly Small Island States,
Welcome Council's Considerations, U.N. Press Release SC/9000 (April 17, 2007), available at http://
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9000.doc.htm.
201. See IAC, Inuit Petition, supra note 7, at 74-91.
202. Limon, supra note 55, at 441.
203. See, e.g., Abdulla Shahid, Foreword to OHCHR, Maldives Submission, supra note 7, at 4;
see also U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: SMALL ISLAND
DEVELOPING STATES 1-3 (2005), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/ccsids.pdf
(advocating for international action on behalf of small island developing states, who are the most
vulnerable to the effects of climate change).
204. See Andrew K. Woods, A Behavioral Approach to Human Rights Law, 51 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 51, 70 (2010).
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allow governments to curtail or not grant rights or freedoms on the basis of
national security, public order, morality, and health-that undermine the full,
205unhampered implementation of the treaties. State parties can further limit
obligations under human rights instruments through formal reservations-"a
claim to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty
in their application to that state." 206
Next, most human rights treaties lack a rigorous enforcement regime. The
success of the treaty body monitoring system depends upon a range of factors,
including whether states submit adequate reports on time; whether the treaty
body committee has sufficient time and expertise to review the report and
question state representatives; whether NGOs have access to information on the
State's fulfillment of human rights to submit to the committee members for
consideration; the quality of the treaty body committee's concluding
observations; the ability of the treaty body committee to follow up on
inadequate reports; and the extent of media attention.207 The process falters at
many stages. An estimated forty-five to eighty percent of states parties to six
UN treaties have overdue reports, with approximately sixty percent of states
parties to six UN treaties having five or more overdue reports.208 Many treaty
body committees have a tremendous backlog in processing overdue reports. By
one estimate, if all the overdue reports were submitted simultaneously to their
respective treaty body committees, it would take the treaty bodies
approximately eight years to process the backlog. 209 In addition to these
concerns, other critics have worried that human rights law may be overly
prescriptive, may establish a "lowest common denominator approach" that
trends towards the least progressive solutions to pressing problems, and may
limit the space for creative, locally appropriate solutions. 2 10
Those well-documented deficiencies exist when applying human rights
law to climate change as well. Although we consider the question of whether
climate change implicates human rights to be closed, academics and
commentators have yet to fully resolve exactly how human rights can protect
205. INT'L LAW ASS'N COMM. ON INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT ON THE
UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: FACING THE IMPLEMENTATION CRISIS (1996), available at
http://www.bayefsky.com/reform/ila.php. There are limitations surrounding the use of reservations. The
Human Rights Committee has emphasized that the reservations cannot undermine the "object or
purpose" of a legal instrument, since this would be an inappropriate gesture for a State party to take with
respect to a human rights treaty.
206. THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: HOw To COMPLAIN ABOUT HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATY VIOLATIONS THE BASIC INTERNATIONAL RULES, http://www.bayefsky.com/complain/
4 rules.php (last visited April 17, 2012); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
Working Paper on Reservations in the Context of Individual Communications, J 5-6, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/2008/II/WP.2 (May 20, 2008).




210. See, e.g., Bruno Simma, Consent: Strains in the Treaty System, in THE STRUCTURE AND
PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 485, 494 (R. St. J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983);
Katharine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of
Content, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 113, 147-48 (2008).
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against the consequences of climate change. Put another way: although climate
change poses "an enormous threat to human rights," it is much more difficult to
determine "what legal duties arise as a result."211 The challenges in applying
human rights law to climate change have been particularly pronounced. Human
rights law has so far been unable to prompt effective state action on climate
change because it is difficult to establish that a state's action-or inaction-
caused a particular harm, as human rights only impose legal duties "vertically"
against states. 212
First, it is challenging to establish liability for climate change harms
because there are evidentiary hurdles to establishing that particular acts or
failures to act specifically caused a climate change injury. As the OHCHR
Report explained, "[t]he physical impacts of global warming cannot easily be
classified as human rights violations, not least because climate change-related
harms often cannot clearly be attributed to acts or omissions of specific
States. Drawing a causal connection between GHG emissions and specific
human rights harms is challenging, in part, because it is difficult to trace
governments' failures to mitigate to specific climate change injuries that those
decisions have caused. Even establishing the existence and level of injury poses
challenges, given that climate change harms are not always overt or
recognizable. 214
After causation, human rights' state actor requirement poses an obstacle
to establishing liability. Marc Limon has noted that "even if responsibility and
harm could be established, existing human rights law is concerned primarily
with how a government treats its own citizens and others living within its
territory and under its jurisdiction." 215 The state actor requirement poses
another significant hurdle to human rights approaches to climate change-if a
particular state did not cause climate change, or at least contribute to it in some
measurable way, how can it be held accountable for the human consequences
of climate change within its territory? Those attempting to bring the law of
human rights to bear on the impacts of climate change "face[] a formidable
obstacle" because for domestic environmental issues, "deference to a state's
decision as to how much environmental harm to allow is justifiable because the
benefits and the costs of the actions causing the harm are felt within a single
polity."216 International human rights law was developed in the context of
addressing harms that neither occur outside the responsible state's borders nor
cross interstate boundaries. 217
211. Knox, Climate Change, supra note 8, at 165.
212. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A
Critical Appraisal, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927-31 (2007).
213. OHCHR Report, supra note 9, at 30.
214. See Eric Biber, Climate Change, Causation, and Delayed Harm, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 975,
977-78 (2009) (noting that such "latent harms," similar to those posed by chemical exposure, pose
challenges under traditional tort law).
215. Limon, supra note 55, at 458.
216. Knox, Climate Change, supra note 8, at 167.
217. Id.
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Looking to international law, Knox sees significant challenges in
developing a framework to resolve this tension, although he points to states'
duty to cooperate as the best legal basis for "extending" human rights law to
218states' actions or inactions with respect to climate change. The duty to
cooperate originates from Article 56 of the UN Charter, which requires
members to cooperate in the promotion of "universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all," undertaken by
219the United Nations in Article 55. The duty to cooperate is also expressly
outlined in the ICESCR, which requires state parties to take steps not just
individually, but also "through international . . . co-operation" toward the
progressive realization of the rights guaranteed under the Covenant. 22 Climate
change is precisely the sort of challenge that requires the international
cooperation envisioned in the UN Charter and in the Covenant. Yet Knox
recognizes that this is not necessarily a forceful basis on which to impose duties
on a state.221
Under international human rights law, legal duties are oriented vertically.
States have the primary responsibility to protect persons within their
boundaries. Beyond those boundaries, states may be unable or unwilling to
fulfill broader obligations in responding to climate change; more significantly,
one state could not effectively mitigate climate change alone given the cross-
222territorial, global nature of climate change. In response, some commentators,
again Knox prominently among them, have presented a way to conceive of
human rights "diagonally"-held by citizens of one state against governments
of other states.223 This conception would hold developed states responsible to
persons in developing states who are suffering harms due to a failure to
mitigate climate change.224 Thus, the duty to cooperate (which provides
relatively weak protections to persons) and conceiving human rights diagonally
(which is far from universally accepted) are the leading analytical frameworks
that can be used to argue that human rights law requires mitigation-which
leaves international law at least temporarily ill-suited to achieve mitigation.
We posit that human rights can and should serve as a key tool in
prompting international action on climate change and on adaptation in
particular. Human rights hold a normative appeal in that they address the
deleterious effects of climate change on humans, and in particular on
218. Id. at 168.
219. See U.N. Charter arts. 55-56. Article 56 requires members' "joint and separate action in
co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Id. art.
56.
220. See ICESCR, supra note 114, art. 2(1).
221. See Knox, Climate Change, supra note 8, at 213-14.
222. See, e.g., VIKRAM KOLMANNSKOG, NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, DIGNITY IN
DISASTERS AND DISPLACEMENT-EXPLORING LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE ON RELOCATION AND
RETURN IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2009).
223. See Knox, supra note 19, at 82. Other commentators have employed the term "diagonal"
to describe cross-cutting rights, duties, and power in somewhat different contexts, including foreign
relations and federalism. Osofsky, supra note 8, at 591 n.20 (collecting uses of the term).
224. See Knox, supra note 19, at 82-83.
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vulnerable individuals who played a negligible role in contributing to the global
problem. Indeed, advocates have invoked a moral imperative to address climate
change harm through a human rights framework. Unlike harms resulting from a
failure to mitigate, which may be best understood as violations of diagonal
rights, it is easier to understand harms from a failure to adapt as violations of
vertical rights. By understanding mitigation and adaptation separately, we can
avoid disrupting longstanding assumptions of human rights law.
In short, we consider the question of whether climate change implicates
human rights to be closed.225 As Kyung-wha Kang, Deputy UN Commissioner
for Human Rights, stated in 2007, "any strategy to deal with climate change,
whether in terms of adaptation or mitigation, must incorporate the
consequences for humans, as individuals and communities, and the human
rights framework is the most effective way to do so." 226 But establishing
causation and state responsibility under international human rights law has
proven analytically intractable when the analysis is limited to mitigation. We
proceed to describe how human rights law can effectively address climate
change harms by beginning with the adaptation obligation.
IV. ADAPTATION THROUGH THE LENS OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Considering the many rights that will be affected by climate change and
by the nature of the response, it is critical to look more narrowly at the human
rights implications of adaptation-or, more aptly, the human rights
implications of a failure to adapt sufficiently to a changing environment.
Irrespective of future international efforts to mitigate climate change, should
states and those that fund them fail to adapt to climate change, human rights
consequences such as those articulated above will be inevitable. The success of
states' and funders' adaptation efforts will, in turn, affect the level and
pervasiveness of violations of human rights like the rights to health, adequate
227shelter, self-determination, and, at the most basic level, the right to life.
In this Part, we posit that human rights analysis to date has largely
ignored the adaptation component of climate change response-a component
that is better suited to human rights analysis than is mitigation. A number of
commentators have concluded that human rights law is unable to address the
effects of climate change since it does not provide a straightforward means for
apportioning blame for events such as flooding and natural disasters. We view
such conclusions as too broad. Indeed, human rights may be more easily
applied to state actions or inactions specifically related to adaptation. In
particular, adaptation-related claims can meet the state actor and causation
requirements of human rights law-the two hurdles that often prevent
225. See OHCRH Report, supra note 9, at 23 ("There exists broad agreement that climate
change has generally negative effects on the realization of human rights."); supra notes 146-222 and
accompanying text.
226. Kang, supra note 55.
227. See McInemey-Lankford, supra note 55, at 436.
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successful litigation or advocacy around mitigation-centered human rights
campaigns. Furthering our argument is a consideration of developing states'
resource constraints and culpability in climate change. We view it as
normatively preferable to require developing states to adapt than to require that
they mitigate harms that they did not cause; the latter would unfairly burden
comparatively low-emitting developing states, and might be pointless, as
successful mitigation cannot take place without concerted efforts from the
highest emitting states.228
Recognizing that adaptation-based claims more easily lend themselves to
human rights remedies both rehabilitates human rights (to the extent such rights
have been ineffectual when applied to climate change issues) and provides
insight into ways in which conventional understandings of human rights law
must adapt if human rights is ever to provide tenable legal relief in addressing
climate change harms. Finally, we discuss ways in which potential claimants
could seek remedies for adaptation-related human rights violations.
A. Adaptation's Role in the Human Rights/Climate Change Disconnect
The heightened emphasis on mitigation in climate change discussions to
date is not entirely problematic. Concentrating on the role of the largest GHG
emitters may help motivate state actors to move against their political self-
interest, or at least to incorporate massive, long-term externalities into a state's
political calculus. Efforts on the mitigation front by the highest emitting states
are the most important piece of the climate change puzzle. Without such action,
climate change will cause increasing harm. The primary responsibility,
normatively, legally, and financially, lies with the states that have caused the
problem. Moreover, the general concept of mitigating harms is a common legal
doctrinal principle, holding wrongdoers accountable for minimizing
damages.229
There are many other questions that get lost when the debate is focused
on emitters. For example, governments of states hit hardest by climate change
may face near-term economic and political consequences for their inaction.
What are their duties, not just morally, but legally? In other words, what, if
anything, should the international community and human rights law require of
the least developed countries as they are forced to adapt to a warming climate?
That a government did not cause a particular harm is not an excuse for its
failure to act in the face of it.230 Developing countries will have to adapt to
228. See infra notes 267-271 and accompanying text.
229. Sue Farran & Jennifer Corrin Care, Towards a Pragmatic Approach to the Contract or
Tort Debate in the South Pacific, 4 J. S. PAC. L. (2000), http://paclii.org/joumals/flSPL/vol04/8.shtml
(comparing the mitigation required under English tort and contract law that applies in the South Pacific);
Michael G. Faure & Ton Hartlief, The Netherlands, 2008 TORT & INS. L.Y.B. 461, 473 (discussing the
duty to mitigate under Dutch tort law); Charles E. Gluckstein, The Duty to Mitigate: Does the Claimant
Have a Duty To "Get Better"? I (Aug. 13, 2002) (unpublished conference speaker notes), available at
http://www.gluckstein.com/uploads/pdfs/TheDutyToMitigate.pdf (discussing mitigation under Canadian
tort law).
230. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 114, art. 2 (imposing a duty on a state party to take steps "to
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climate challenges. And all too often, under-resourced, ineffectual, or simply
corrupt governments in the developing world have avoided delivering on
human rights commitments to their citizens. Direct aid, capacity-building, and
other efforts from developed countries play an important role in addressing
these deficiencies, but individual state accountability for actions or inaction
with respect to climate change is important as well.231
As governments make and institute policies and allocate resources to
adapt to climate change, the legal community should apply-and reconsider-
domestic and international legal frameworks to evaluate states' resource-
allocation decisions and other adaptive responses. Put another way, human
rights law itself will have to adapt to adaptation (and climate change more
broadly), as lawyers and policymakers reevaluate a number of doctrines to
account for the reality of climate change.232 As Limon put it: can developed
countries really tell people in small island nations, for example, "that their
human rights have not been violated because it is difficult to apportion
responsibility?" 233 He argues that "[p]erhaps we must, but that is surely because
the law is wrong, rather than because our instincts of fairness, equity, and
justice are wrong." 234 The ICHRP has similarly noted that "[w]hereas progress
on international human rights law has been incremental at best for decades, the
scale of the challenge climate change poses to public policy will create
increasing pressure to review and reorganise international rights and duties."235
Human rights law emerges as rigid, and somewhat simplistic, in addressing
climate change-related issues. Our goal throughout this Part, then, is to further
the discussion on the role of human rights law in recognizing climate change
harms generally, and to begin a discussion about human rights' recognition of
adaptation-related claims in particular.
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption
of legislative measures"). But see Stockberger v. United States, 332 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2003) (setting
forth, in an opinion by Judge Posner, the general common law rule against affirmative duties and
explaining that such broad duties to act in the absence of causing harm would be difficult to manage);
Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Affirmative Duties and Judges'Duties: United States v. Stockberger, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1228 (2007).
231. See, e.g., Edward Cameron, The Human Dimension of Global Climate Change, 15
HASTINGS W,-NW. J. ENvTL L. & POL'Y 1, 13-14 (2009) (recognizing that "[i]f a direct link can be
established between climate change impacts and the enjoyment of rights this could . .. impose a duty on
states to focus their adaptation measures on the most vulnerable communities within their jurisdiction").
232. See, e.g., Knox, supra note 19, at 82 (noting that "international law has not adopted a
comprehensive, uniform approach to [diagonal] rights," but that international environmental law and
human rights law has "begun to develop some possible bases for diagonal environmental rights").
233. Limon, supra note 55, at 468-69.
234. Id. at 469.
235. ICHRP, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 20 ("A research agenda
might therefore seek to incorporate human rights language and concerns into upcoming climate change
agreements, for example in the post-2012 regime now under discussion.").
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B. Human Rights Law Applied to Adaptation: Establishing Liability
and Accountability
Although human rights law, at least as it is conventionally understood,
does not neatly accommodate issues relating to "climate change," 236 these
deficiencies are at least partly cured when adaptation is separated from a
broader discussion of climate change. This is significant for those whose rights
would be violated by states' actions in implementing particular adaptation
projects---or, more likely, failing to implement projects. Those individuals may
have legal recourse, and states may have enforceable obligations to their
citizens in this respect.
1. States' Liability for Adaptation-Related Human Rights
Violations: Overcoming Causation and the State Actor
Problem
As described earlier, conventionally understood human rights law
provides no true (or at least no robust) liability or remedial framework for
addressing the largely transnational causes and concomitant harms of climate
change.237 While these human rights limits are daunting when analyzing
climate change mitigation, human rights law can and does provide a workable
framework for approaching adaptation. Adapting or failing to adapt can more
discernibly cause human rights violations than can decisions regarding
mitigation practices. As we have described above, adaptation decisions are
likely made closer, in terms of geography and time, to those affected by the
policies. 238
A hypothetical helps to illustrate how a government could be held
accountable under a human rights framework for an adaptation-related claim.
Over time, states will be faced with rising sea levels and increased flooding,239
and many of the adaptation projects already underway relate to minimizing
impacts from flooding.240 Suppose a government receives adaptation funding
that it then squanders, despite warnings that a dam will fail if not repaired,
causing mass flooding to an adjacent low-lying subsistence farming
community, and possibly loss of life. Can legal advocates wield human rights
law to hold the government liable for its actions? Yes, albeit likely after the
harm from those abuses has occurred. Under the "progressive realization"
doctrine surrounding socioeconomic rights, if a government has available
resources but does not prioritize an action, and there is a breach of human
rights as a result, one can make a colorable claim for government redress before
236. See, e.g., ICHRP, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 3-6; Knox,
Climate Change, supra note 8, at 165-68; Limon, supra note 55, at 458; Posner, supra note 212, at
1935-38.
237. Limon, supra note 55, at 458.
238. See supra notes 65-64 and accompanying text.
239. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 90.




an international, or in certain instances, a domestic, tribunal. States must act
to the extent their resources allow in order to fulfill socioeconomic rights
progressively and continuously, and this legal doctrine can extend readily to
state inaction towards adaptation. 242 As such, this ex post remedy, if robust in
nature, might moderate government intransigence in the future. 243
Complete inaction despite available funding, like discriminatory action, is
simple to understand through a human rights perspective-it is not allowed.
But government action to spend limited adaptation funding and implement
adaptation projects has the potential to raise more nuanced challenges. Another
hypothetical demonstrates the complexity inherent in identifying a precise set
of policies or projects that comports with human rights. Suppose when
confronted with the looming dam breach described above, the government
decides to require the relocation of two small communities rather than the move
of a large mining company that employs several hundred people across the
country and contributes substantially to the country's tax base. The government
implements a cursory program for assuaging threats to the soon-to-be-displaced
community members' homes, livelihoods, health, and lives-a small stipend
for each family to cover the basic costs of relocating and finding new land
elsewhere. Would a human rights approach permit such an exercise? It is
unclear. As former Justice Albie Sachs from the Constitutional Court of South
Africa has explained, balancing and apportionment are inherent in the exercise
of progressively realizing rights in resource-constrained settings.244 The
Constitutional Court's jurisprudence reflects such balancing.245 One may easily
identify certain procedural deficiencies in this scenario-for example,
participation is a fundamental principle in human rights approaches but lacking
here-suggesting that the government's approach may fall short of what human
rights law requires.
Further, one could imagine how a cash payment could fail in other ways.
For example, cultural norms could require women to give cash to men in the
community, and the women could effectively be left even more vulnerable,
without housing or with other unmet needs. Since human rights approaches pay
special attention to the needs of a state's most vulnerable citizens, a human
rights approach should closely examine how adaptation decisions impact these
citizens. At times there is no clear "best" human rights approach, and human
rights may point to a "second best" alternative, or a range of alternatives, that
241. OHCRH Report, supra note 9,175.
242. See ICESCR, supra note 78, art. 2, 1 1.
243. Of course, a different complication would arise if the same state had not received
adaptation funding and the same dam had failed, inundating the same low-lying farming community. In
such an altered hypothetical, the "to the maximum of its available resources" savings clause of the
ICESCR may absolve the state of some human rights obligations, but it is more challenging to determine
what the state's obligations would be as to nonderogable rights, such as the right to life. See Human
Rights Committee, supra note 125, 1; General Comment No. 14, supra note 125, 1 1.
244. See World Bank Institute, First Regional Latin American Symposium on Right to Health
and Health Systems Meeting Report 6-7 (June 23-24, 2011) (on file with Authors).
245. See id.
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optimizes outcomes given a variety of pragmatic constraints.
Similarly, adaptation-related claims could also raise issues concerning
how to resolve conflicts when a state's existing human rights obligations to its
citizens clash with issues related to climate change adaptation. In developing
nations, one would expect that the overlap could be considerable. Suppose a
state was forced to choose between providing clean water to seventy-five
percent of its population or protecting ten percent of its population from the
high probability of climate change-induced flooding.246 From a political and
policy perspective, the former option likely would be the nation's highest
priority, but the prioritization question poses challenges-can the decision to
prioritize provide a state an affirmative defense to claims of human rights
violations? Furthermore, as the World Bank has noted in discussing the
connection between adaptation and traditional development projects, "there are
numerous 'low-regret' actions-typically policies that would be priorities for
development even without climate change-especially in water supply and
flood protection." 247 Low-regret options are those "actions that are robust under
most climate scenarios," and especially those that provide benefits even outside
the climate change context.248 Arguably, such options should be given high
priority.
2. States'Accountability for Adaptation-Related Human Rights
Violation
Liability is a legal question; accountability is a more normative
consideration. Liability describes whether individuals or communities can
prevail on human rights charges against states arising from climate change-
related impacts. Causation is generally a mandatory element of establishing
liability; under human rights law, a party needs to be shown to have caused the
harm to be held liable for the remedy.249 By contrast, accountability questions
ask whether the individuals or communities should be able to bring human
rights claims arising from climate change-related injuries.
Accountability is an important consideration in addition to liability
because of the limited vertical nature of human rights, which have traditionally
been regarded as running between an individual and the state.250 Yet
commentators disagree about the degree to which developing countries should
be held accountable for human rights violations due to climate change.251 Some
of the difficulty in resolving this question can be removed by segregating
discussions of mitigation from those of adaptation.
With mitigation, there are significant equitable issues in holding
246. Thanks to Robin Kundis Craig for pointing out this issue.
247. WORLD BANK, supra note 75, at xvi.
248. Id. at xxviii.
249. See OHCHR Report, supra note 9, at n.24.
250. ICHRP, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 76.
251. See infra notes 256-261 and accompanying text.
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developing countries accountable for reducing emissions. Certainly, there is
broad consensus that developed countries are primarily responsible for GHG
levels and thus for the mitigation practices that can (partially) ameliorate their
effects. Individuals in developing countries claiming human rights violations by
developed states will confront problems in their legal challenges because, under
traditional conceptions of human rights laws, other governments who primarily
caused climate change are not their governments and therefore are not legally
accountable to them. Some commentators have argued that developing
countries should not be held accountable for human rights violations resulting
from climate change-or at least that developed states should be held more
accountable.252 Their argument maintains that in the vertically organized world
of human rights, the typical "assignation of responsibility may seem inadequate
in the context of climate change, where social and economic rights in poor
countries are threatened primarily by actions undertaken elsewhere."253 As
previously described, John Knox has discussed this issue as part of his
advancement of "diagonal human rights" and proposals of fora through which
individuals could assert these rights.
Yet, developing states should be held accountable for human rights
violations stemming from adaptation decisions because, fair or not, climate
change imposes duties on low-emitting states, particularly those that have
255committed to advancing socioeconomic rights. The OHCHR has advanced a
similar view, stating that "irrespective of the additional strain climate change-
related events may place on available resources, States remain under an
obligation to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of economic, social and
cultural rights under any given circumstances."256 As an important part of this
obligation, the OHCHR explained, "States must, as a matter of priority, seek to
satisfy core obligations and protect groups in society who are in a particularly
vulnerable situation."257 Another way to phrase this position would be that
when developing countries adopt negotiating positions defending the "right" to
development, they must nonetheless adhere to their obligation to protect the
258fulfillment of human rights domestically. Developing countries need not
fulfill these rights exclusively through their own funding, but they remain
accountable for whatever funds they receive and expend. After all,
252. See, e.g., ICHRP, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 80 (stating that
"[tihe special responsibility of wealthy countries to mitigate climate change remains - and is widely
accepted"); Eric Neumayer, Commentary, In Defence of Historical Accountability for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, 33 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 185, 187-88 (2000) (arguing for historical accountability for GHG
emissions, though not discussing human rights); Oliver C. Ruppel, Environmental Rights and Justice
Under the Namibian Constitution, 327 n.29 (2010) (noting the "special responsibility of wealthy
countries" to address climate change in the face of human rights violations related to climate change),
available at http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/constitution 2010/ruppel.pdf.
253. ICHRP, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 76.
254. See Knox, supra note 19, at 82.
255. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST., 1996, arts. 26-29.
256. OHCRH Report, supra note 9, at 25.
257. Id.
258. ICHRP, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 11.
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Since every state is under a prior obligation to 'take steps .. . to the maximum of
its available resources' to fulfill those rights, they are logically obliged to ensure
that, insofar as they can influence international assistance and cooperation, the
latter contribute to fulfillment of their citizens' social and economic rights and do
not undermine them."259
Limon has taken issue with the OHCHR's view and criticized its
understanding of human rights and climate change policy because it "seems
perverse from the perspective of small vulnerable countries, which are, in
effect, being told to take additional strain so as to honor their obligations in the
face of a phenomenon (climate change) for which they bear almost no
responsibility."260 As our discussion illustrates, Limon's objection seems
sensible when examining climate change response overall, and particularly
sensible when discussing mitigation. For adaptation, however, it may be less
perverse to hold developing states to a human rights standard. Particularly if
developed states begin providing significant financial assistance to developing
states, some accountability for that funding seems both practically necessary
and normatively desirable. 261 A human rights framework provides one tool to
enable community members to insist upon government accountability in the
expenditure of these funds.262
Our argument is that these competing conceptions regarding the
responsibility (or lack of responsibility) of developing states need not be in
conflict. By distinguishing adaptation from mitigation more rigorously, Annex
I countries may be held responsible for mitigation while all countries, including
non-industrialized countries, are held responsible for adaptation. In other
words, it may be normatively desirable to hold only, or mostly, Annex I states
responsible for mitigation, while asking comparatively more of developing
countries with respect to adaptation.263 As the UNDP has argued, with
responsible state action ex ante, "[n]ot every drought is the prelude to famine,
malnutrition or educational privation. And not every climate shock gives rise to
the distress sale of assets, long-run increases in vulnerability or the spread of
259. Id.
260. Limon, supra note 55, at 458 n.105.
261. See TRANSPARENCY INT'L, POLICY POSITION: MONITORING CLIMATE ADAPTATION
FINANCING TO ENSURE EFFECTIVENESS (Mar. 2011) (highlighting the need for transparency and
accountability in the delivery and spending of funds).
262. For example, outside of the climate change context, the International Council on Human
Rights Policy and Transparency International have explained how corruption, embezzlement, and
misappropriation of state resources can lead to actionable human rights violations and how such
concerns should be addressed in part through monitoring government contracting and international aid.
See INT'L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY & TRANSPARENCY INT'L, CORRUPTION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: MAKING THE CONNECTION 74-76, 89-90 (2009), available at www.ichrp.org/files/rcports/
40/13 1_web.pdf.
263. See Nancy Birdsall, President, Ctr. for Global Dev., Remarks at The Brookings Institution
Conference on Climate Change Adaptation in a Post-Durban World 20-22 (Jan. 6, 2012) (discussing the
need for increased accountability for developing states' use of adaptation funding than has traditionally




low human development traps."264 Governments play a critical role in reducing
the effects of these events, and they will have to adapt their policies as climate
change increases the frequency of such events.265
Large emitting states' accountability for human rights violations is not,
however, the primary focus of this Article. Other authors have addressed that
question, and there plainly are compelling reasons to find large emitters
responsible for much of the climate change response. However, such
responsibility is difficult to 'determine precisely, resisted by large-emitting
states, and may not be a legally sufficient basis for near-term human rights
decisions. Sidestepping such a discussion in this Article is not to absolve large
emitters for a problem that is almost entirely of their making; that would be
irresponsible, unfair, and misguided. Yet it is important to consider
accountability for reducing emissions and adapting to the impact of climate
change separately because of the vertical and diagonal legal relationships
discussed above. Distinguishing the adaptation responsibility of developing
countries from the mitigation and adaptation responsibility of developed
countries when considering the intersection of climate change and human rights
requires framing human rights claims based on adaptation decisions under
traditional, vertical human rights law, while acknowledging that mitigation-
based claims may need to be conceived diagonally.
C. Adaptation and Human Rights Remedies
Even if it is possible to establish causation, there are still hurdles to
vindicating a particular human right. For example, an injured person can often
identify and even establish liability for a human rights violation yet be unable
to achieve a remedy.2 66 The problem of remedying identified human rights
violations is hardly new. One of the most powerful examples demonstrating the
importance of remedies for human rights violations is the case of Irene
Grootboom. In Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, the
Constitutional Court of South Africa affirmed the government's constitutional
responsibility to respect the right to housing and to enact and fund policies
designed to realize that right.267 The decision was hailed around the world as
268the leading socioeconomic rights decision from any nation's high court. Cass
264. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 89.
265. Id. at 172.
266. In addition, the difficulty of achieving a remedy can often limit the very nature of the right
itself. See Margaux J. Hall & David C. Weiss, Human Rights and Remedial Equilibration: Equilibrating
Socio-Economic Rights, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 453, 455 (2011) (explaining that in "human rights cases
(and socio-economic rights cases in particular), the very nature of the right at issue [i]s a product of
tangible, practical concerns about implementation of attendant remedies").
267. 2000 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Aft.).
268. See, e.g., Mark S. Kende, The South African Constitutional Court's Embrace of Socio-
Economic Rights: A Comparative Perspective, 6 CHAP. L. REv. 137 (2003); Sandra Liebenberg, The
Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South Africa, 17 S.
AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 232 (2001); Kameshni Pillay, Implementation ofGrootboom: Implications for the
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Sunstein described Grootboom as an "extraordinary decision" that "carries
some significant lessons for the future" because the decision was "the first time
in the history of the world [that] a constitutional court has initiated a process
that might well succeed in the endeavor of ensuring [socio-economic rights']
protection without placing courts in an unacceptable managerial role."269 But to
much less notice, in August 2008, eight years after Ms. Grootboom vindicated
her right in her nation's highest court, she died in her forties, "homeless and
penniless." 270
As difficult as achieving a human rights remedy is, it likely will be even
more challenging in cases arising out of claims related to climate change. The
ICHRP, for one, has noted that the implications of climate change will be felt
most strongly in "the world's poorest countries, where rights protections are
often weak." 271 Whether suing in domestic courts or bringing claims in
international tribunals, the argument goes, there is not a realistic way for parties
to seek remedies for their claims even if they can establish causation and, more
broadly, liability. In turn, where remedies are not available, the very existence
of the right is called into question.
Differentiating the subset of adaptation claims from the broader group of
climate change claims may lessen this concern. Eric Posner, for example, has
argued that neither international environmental law, nor human rights law-
which he notes is a more robust legal framework-provides a useful context for
litigating claims.272 He has argued that in addition to problems with national
litigation, "the weakness of the law also makes litigation before international
tribunals largely pointless, except, perhaps, as a way of attracting attention."273
But if causal links and liability are connected to narrower geographic,
governmental, and temporal ranges in the context of adaptation, perhaps
national-level litigation is not "mostly useless." This is especially likely in
countries such as South Africa or India that include socioeconomic rights in
their constitutions, making it possible to bring individual claims based on
alleged rights violations.274
Tribunals presented with adaptation-related human rights claims might
also have flexibility to fashion creative remedies. Even if a remedy cannot
Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights, 6 L., DEMOCRACY & DEv. 255 (2002) (noting that Grootboom
"has been hailed as a milestone victory for homeless and landless people of South Africa" although
raising doubts as to the implementation of its results); Pierre de Vos, Substantive Equality After
Grootboom: The Emergence of Social and Economic Context as a Guiding Value in Equality
Jurisprudence, 2001 ACTA JURIDICA 52.
269. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 221-22 (2001).
270. Pearlie Joubert, Grootboom Dies Homeless and Penniless, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE
(Aug. 8, 2008), http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-08-08-grootboom-dies-homeless-and-penniless.
271. ICHRP, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 76; see also supra notes
133, 137, 141 and accompanying text.
272. Posner, supra note 212, at 1927.
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., Khosa v. Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) (S. Aft.);
People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2001 (India) (Nov.
28, 2001, interim order) (establishing a constitutional right to food).
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completely respond to a particular claim presented to the tribunal, it could
begin to fulfill human rights and address climate-related concerns. For
example, pursuant to the UNFCCC, developing countries are creating National
Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) that "identify priority activities
that respond to their urgent and immediate needs to adapt to climate change-
those for which further delay would increase vulnerability and/or costs at a later
,,275stage. A tribunal could, perhaps, recognize that a state has limited resources
to comply with an order that would completely remedy an adaptation-related
human rights claim. It could then order a progressive injunction commanding
the relevant government authority to review regularly and modify its NAPA in
a certain way, in order to prioritize the problem underlying the claim before the
tribunal.
Finally, recent developments in socioeconomic rights may facilitate
adaptation-based human rights claims at the international level. The Optional
Protocol to the ICESCR recently entered into force and may be a promising
avenue by which to bring climate change-related claims linking adaptation and
human rights.276 Tribunals, in adjudicating individual human rights complaints,
can develop a common law regarding environmental protection and adaptation.
As John Knox has argued, such rulings have the potential to complement
environmental regulations in the same manner that nuisance and other common
law tort doctrines complement state-level regulatory environmental law.277
V. TOWARD A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO ADAPTATION
In the discussion above, we argued that applying a human rights
framework to adaptation and mitigation separately-and focusing on
adaptation-makes climate change more amenable to human rights analysis. In
this Part, we demonstrate how a human rights approach can be particularly
relevant to adaptation policy and projects.
Although states, international bodies, and commentators have made a
variety of objections to applying human rights law to climate change, as stated
above, we join a number of observers who view the issue of whether climate
change implicates human rights as settled.278 Nevertheless, some of the stated
objections do raise significant questions about whether human rights law can
have any practical effect in the climate change debate.279 As we explain in this
275. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties On
Its Fourth Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Fourth Session, at 4,
Bonn, Ger., July 16-27, 2001, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/L.7 (July 24,2001).
276. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 63/117, at 2, U.N. Doc. AIRES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Optional Protocol]; see
Press Release, United Nations New Optional Protocol on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
'Rotterdam Rules' Signed by Nearly 50 States During 2009 Treaty Event, U.N. Press Release L/T/4418
(Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/does/2009/Lt4418.doc.htm (last visited
Jan. 28, 2010).
277. Knox, supra note 19, at 85.
278. See OHCHR Report, supra note 9, at 5; supra Part III.
279. The United States, for example, has spoken out against such efforts. In the U.S.
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Part, however, the objections to the application of human rights to climate
change are less relevant when one considers adaptation in isolation from the
broader set of challenges raised by climate change.
Focusing a human rights lens on adaptation is a useful endeavor for many
reasons. Several of the benefits of the human rights approach are uniquely
helpful in the context of adaptation; some also counter the often-cited reasons
for why a human rights approach to climate change generally will be
ineffectual. For one, because of the more local community level on which
adaptation practices take place, a human rights approach would emphasize the
rights of smaller communities of persons, which may be easier to assess
accurately than those of large, more diverse communities or of entire states,
which involve broad generalizations. Moreover, a human rights approach to
adaptation can assist policymakers in setting priorities for spending adaptation
funds, which will likely be more limited than resources for mitigation. In
addition, because adaptation measures tend to impact communities on a more
human scale than do mitigation practices, and hence have a closer connection
to the fulfillment of human rights articulated in a range of legal instruments,
adaptation practices may more effectively mobilize the political support
necessary to address climate change. Finally, adaptation projects can be
designed and implemented proactively to safeguard human rights in procedural
and substantive manners.
As we consider why applying human rights to climate change adaptation
is particularly useful, we explore some of the consequences of that argument.
Once we understand how human rights are particularly relevant to adaptation,
we ask how adaptation policymakers can incorporate human rights concepts
and thresholds into adaptation practices. As the UNDP has noted, "the world's
poor cannot adapt their way out of dangerous climate change," but "the impacts
of global warming can be diminished through good policies." 280 Thus, our
submission to the OHCHR, the United States argued that "moving toward a human rights-based
approach to climate protection would be impractical and unwise," United States of America, Submission
to OHCHR, Human Rights Council Res. 7/23, 17 (2008) [hereinafter United States Res. 7/23
Submission], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/climatechange/docs/submissions/
USA.pdf, because "[a] complex global environmental problem with these characteristics does not lend
itself to human rights-based solutions." Id. at 23. It continues, "[a) central purpose of human rights law
. . . is providing remedies for the victims of specific rights violations. . . . This framework requires
identifiable violations, and identifiable harms attributable to the violations." Id. 23-24. This stance by
the United States was primarily based on a remedial view of human rights in which they are designed to
create an opportunity for individuals and communities to seek remedies from the government whose
jurisdiction they are under. Knox, Linking Human Rights, supra note 7, at 490. As the United States
argued, "It will be difficult and problematic to identify any particular party as being uniquely
responsible for any particular impairment of the enjoyment of human rights caused by climate change or
even any particular harm as being proximately caused by a particular act or omission by any particular
government or governmental actor." United States Res. 7/23 Submission, supra, 25. While the United
States has likely been the state most strongly opposed to viewing climate change in a rights-based
context, there has been only tepid support by other states for such an approach. As Knox has described
in discussing the OHCHR submissions, "[a]lthough the United Kingdom seemed to support a role for
human rights in considering climate change, it made clear that it did not regard climate change as a
human rights violation, and even the Maldives and the Marshall Islands did not press for that
conclusion." Knox, Linking Human Rights, supra note 7, at 490 (internal citation omitted).
280. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 167.
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discussion includes some initial suggestions for ways in which adaptation
policies at the community, national, and international levels could incorporate
and benefit from the application of a human rights approach.
A. Adaptation Decisionmaking
As an initial matter, it is important that international, state, and local
governments begin to incorporate human rights considerations in
decisionmaking on adaptation practices. As many of the least-developed states'
NAPAs demonstrate, the first step in implementing an adaptation plan often is
to create a framework through which a state or local government can make
structured decisions on adaptation policy.281 If human rights are to be protected
in the face of climate change, decisionmaking processes should take into
account human rights norms and protections.
Human rights law focuses on individuals and communities, and,
accordingly, a human rights approach to adaptation would emphasize collecting
local-level information to support adaptation efforts. Climate change analysis
generally remains aggregated at the continental or subregional level, a practice
that is logical for mitigation since GHGs cross borders, but does not lend itself
to understanding the human implications of adaptation decisions.282 For
example, in the context of U.S. environmental law and adaptation, Robin
Kundis Craig has noted the need to "monitor and study everything all the
time."283 In other words, it is not possible to deliver adequately adaptation
funding without sufficient local knowledge, which is lacking, particularly-and
most tragically-in the resource-poor areas that need adaptation funding the
most.284 Adaptation policymakers and planners should, therefore, collect more
information on individuals and communities, drawing in part on the knowledge
that human rights workers have regarding local conditions. To the extent that
this information gathering has begun to occur through the least developed
states' NAPAs, 285 such an effort is a positive development. Moreover, because
so many adaptation projects are small-scale, community-based endeavors, it is
likely that information sharing across regions and project types is sparse at best.
An international effort-ideally within the UNFCCC framework-to establish
281. See, e.g., Republic of Guinea-Bissau, National Adaptation Programme of Action, 46-50
(Feb. 2008), available at http://unfecc.int/resource/docs/napa/gnb0l.pdf; Government of Rwanda,
National Adaptation Programme of Action, 41-48 (May 2007), available at http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/napa/rwa0le.pdf; Republic of Vanuatu, National Adaptation Programme of Action, 28-32
(Dec. 2007), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/vut01.pdf.
282. ICHRP, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 4.
283. Kundis Craig, supra note 14, at 40-43.
284. See Stem, supra note 124.
285. See, e.g., Government of Nepal, National Adaptation Programme of Action, 24-28 (Nov.
2010), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/npl0l.pdf; Republic of Yemen, Environment
Protection Authority, National Adaptation Programme of Action, 5-7 (Apr. 2009), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/yemO.pdf; Government of Sierra Leone, Ministry of Transport and
Aviation, National Adaptation Programme of Action, 16, 37, 77, 79, 82-84 (Dec. 2007), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napalsle0l.pdf; Republic of the Maldives, National Adaptation
Programme of Action, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/mdv0l.pdf (Dec. 2006).
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information sharing and transfer on adaptation projects would help monitor and
evaluate efforts to secure human rights and share lessons learned. Such
information sharing can also ensure good governance and transparency in
decisions about the distribution and use of adaptation funding.286
Beyond information gathering, human rights can and should inform
substantive adaptation decisionmaking from international funding decisions to
local project implementation. Human rights standards and thresholds can
provide benchmarks that are based on widely agreed upon principles.
Admittedly, as the ICHRP has noted, such guidance is rough and (like much
climate-related prediction) prone to continual revision. It consists of sets of
pointers rather than a formula or social "blueprint"; but could nevertheless
provide "specific tools for identifying and managing risk."28 7 For example,
Angola's NAPA highlights that country's "National Strategy for food and
nutritional security and its Plan of Action," which "recognises the right to food
as fundamental and aims to create conditions to guarantee that every Angolan
citizen has lasting food security."288 The NAPA demonstrates awareness that
this human rights-based benchmark relates to adaptation, explaining that to
respond to climate change while furthering the right to food and nutritional
security, the state must support "increasing and diversifying agricultural,
livestock and fishery production in a sustainable way," while also "creating and
[sic] inter-sectoral platform for coordinating policies and actions in matters of
food and nutritional security, with participation from civil society."289
In addition to inputting information into adaptation decisionmaking,
human rights should also play a role in the procedural aspects of adaptation
decisionmaking. For example, in the United States, several commentators have
called for a rethinking of domestic structures to allow agency discretion in
implementing adaptation policies.290 Procedurally, human rights standards call
for information sharing and participation of those affected by policies;
government transparency, public participation, and rational decisionmaking are
paramount.291 Indeed, the international community acknowledged in the
preamble of Human Rights Council Resolution 10/4 that human rights
principles, including access to information, decisionmaking, and provision of a
286. See TRANSPARENCY INT'L, supra note 261, at I (noting that the volume of adaptation
funding is "unprecedented and underscores the need for transparency, accountability and equity" in
delivery of funds).
287. Id.
288. Angola, National Adaptation Programme of Action, supra note 73, at 77-78.
289. Id.
290. See, e.g., Kundis Craig, supra note 14, at 67.
291. See, e.g., ICHRP, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 8; Svitlana
Kravchenko, Right to Carbon or Right to Life: Human Rights Approaches to Climate Change, 9 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 513, 541-47 (2008) (discussing access to information and public participation). In addition,
Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention addresses public participation: "Each party shall make appropriate
practical and/or other provisions for the public to participate during the preparation of plans and
programmes relating to the environment, within a transparent and fair framework, having provided the
necessary information to the public." TRANSPARENCY INT'L, supra note 261, at 2 (emphasizing the
importance of appropriate governance over adaptation funds).
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judicial remedy, might improve policymaking in the area of climate change.292
As procedural structures for raising and allocating adaptation funding become
more developed, and likely bureaucratic, it is critical to integrate human rights
into these procedures. Such human rights-informed procedures are particularly
important for adaptation decisions, which permanently commit funds to a
particular adaptation program or course of conduct at the exclusion of others,
and can themselves affect substantive rights.293
B. Human Rights as an Adaptation Prioritization Tool
Inputs aside, as a larger and more practical example of how human rights
can inform adaptation law and policy, human rights should guide international
prioritization of adaptation strategies.294 In most countries, adaptation is not
treated as an integral part of development strategy. "Both donors and national
governments are responding to the adaptation challenge principally through
project-based institutional structures operating outside planning systems for
,,295
budgets and poverty reduction strategies. Nor do most states' adaptation
296
plans typically include any reference to a consideration of human rights.
Incorporating human rights safeguards into adaptation law and policy likely
would improve human rights outcomes. It would also establish common ground
in often-contentious funding debates by framing adaptation practices in terms
of universal norms.
Differences in policy approaches to adaptation and mitigation also
counsel in favor of using human rights to prioritize adaptation projects. While
mitigating climate change is an immense challenge, there is some agreement
that it is one that must be met, and states and international actors have set
degree-targets for tolerable global warming.297 In other words-putting aside
for a moment how (un)successful mitigation efforts have been or will be-there
is an effort in mitigation policy to work backwards from the answer, setting the
level of acceptable warming and then trying to craft international GHG
emissions policies to achieve that level of warming. Adaptation policy has
tended to work differently. While there are estimates of how much global
adaptation may cost, most observers would concede that there is even less
confidence about the amount of money needed for successful adaptation policy
292. Limon, supra note 55, at 452.
293. See Kundis Craig, supra note 14, at 68.
294. See Hunter, supra note 8, at 360.
295. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 196.
296. See, e.g., Lao People's Democratic Republic, National Adaptation Programme of Action
(Apr. 2009), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/laos0l.pdf; The Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, National Adaptation Programme of Action (June 2007), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/eth01.pdf; Royal Government of Bhutan, National Adaptation
Programme of Action (May 2006), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/btnOl.pdf. But see
Afghanistan Global Environment Facility, National Capacity Needs Self-Assessment for Global
Environmental Management (NCSA) and National Adaptation Programme of Action, at 29, 77 (Feb.
2009), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/afg0 I.pdf (mentioning human rights).
297. E.g., ANTHONY GIDDENs, THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 22, 81-83 (2008).
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than about the GHG emission reductions necessary for successful mitigation
policy.298 In reality, adaptation finance will likely follow a strategy of simply
raising as much money from the developed world as is politically and
economically possible. 299
The result of this policy approach is likely to be a structural deficit in
adaptation funding that will leave policymakers with insufficient resources to
cover all worthy projects. There are innumerable ways to tell the story of the
adaptation deficit. For example, the UNDP estimates that "at least $40 billion
will be needed by 2015 to strengthen national strategies for poverty reduction
in the face of climate change risks." 30 However, although the UNFCCC
obligates developed country governments to support adaptation efforts in
developing countries, financial support for adaptation programs as of
November 2011 has so far amounted to just $255 million.3 ol
This adaptation deficit will result in difficult policy choices of a different
nature than the tough policy choices encountered in mitigation efforts. If GHG
emissions are set at the international level, state-level policymakers will have
individual GHG emissions targets and policymakers will debate how best to
distribute those costs between firms and individuals whose consumption or
production leads to GHG emissions. For U.S. mitigation decisions, for
example, once the GHG emissions level (or tax) is set, taxing producers or
allocating a cap-and-trade scheme may not have significant human rights
implications. A state-level adaptation policymaker, by contrast, may have a list
of worthy projects and will have to choose which ones to prioritize in the face
of limited funds. Choosing to fund or not fund certain projects may have
immediate or longer-term human rights implications. National or local
adaptation policies, therefore, can benefit from a human rights focus more than
the equivalent decisions in mitigation policy.
Applying human rights to adaptation policies can also help prioritize and
frame responses in emergency or disaster settings. A general objection to
linking human rights and climate change holds that emergencies or natural
disasters limit the application of human rights law because either the rights are
temporarily derogated or the emergency regime simply ignores them. The
argument is that catastrophic drought, floods, or famine will result in large-
298. See, e.g., Naomi Oreskes, David A. Stainforth & Leonard A. Smith, Adaptation to Global
Warming: Do Climate Models Tell Us What We Need To Know?, 77 PHIL. OF SCI. 1012, 1025-26
(2010) (noting the extreme unknowns surrounding the cost of adaptation).
299. See AFR. P'SHIP FORUM, FINANCING CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION IN
AFRICA: KEY ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR POLICY-MAKERS AND NEGOTIATORS 4-6 (May 2009), available
at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3486.pdf (discussing several adaptation funding proposals
that focus on transferring money from the developed to the developing world through a variety of tax,
subsidy, or other funding mechanisms).
300. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 15.
301. Adaptation Fund, CLIMATE FUNDS UPDATE, http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/
adaptation-fund (last visited Apr. 1, 2012). Although this level of funding results in a staggering
adaptation deficit, it is a significant improvement over the $26 million that had been provided as of
2008. See UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 1, at 15 (noting that the
amount of funding available for adaptation was, as of 2008, equivalent to the United Kingdom's weekly
spending on flood defense programs).
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scale rights infringement with no accompanying recourse. Adaptation provides
space for human rights to inform policymaking in this area. For example, in
one of the few commentaries specifically linking adaptation and human rights,
David Hunter argues that the generally accepted right to housing suggests that
individuals have a right to temporary shelter while their homes are being
repaired following a disaster. 302 Therefore, "[p]roviding basic shelter to the
victims of natural disasters," Hunter argues, "could arguably be a higher
priority than other adaptation expenses." 303 As an example, he notes that in the
domestic context, victims of Hurricane Katrina "would stand higher in the
queue for adaptation funds than would those whose vacation homes in Miami
Beach are threatened by coastal sea level rise."3a Similar-albeit more
difficult-choices could be made about obligations to fulfill rights to food or
water, ensuring that fundamental human needs, those generally protected by
human rights law, are met first in creating adaptation policies or designing and
implementing adaptation projects.305
Moreover, some of these decisions are already being made on a statewide
basis and within the UNFCCC. Beginning with Mauritania's NAPA submission
in 2004306 and continuing through Angola's submission in December 2011,307
the NAPAs that developing countries are creating "contain a list of ranked
priority adaptation activities and projects, as well as short profiles of each
activity or project, designed to facilitate the development of proposals for
implementation."3os Yet, even as planners make decisions regarding which
adaptation projects and policies are more worthy than others, the NAPAs
typically have not incorporated human rights considerations. 309 Although it
may not be too late to incorporate human rights considerations as plans become
realized, human rights seem more likely to be protected if they are incorporated
during states' early stages of planning adaptation. 310
302. Hunter, supra note 8, at 360.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 361.
305. Id. at 360-61.
306. Angola National Adaptation Programme of Action, supra note 73.
307. Islamic Republic of Mauritania, National Adaptation Programme of Action (Nov. 2004),
available at http://unfcc.int/resource/docs/napa/mau01 e.pdf.
308. See NAPA Priorities Database, UNITED NATiONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE (Mar. 29, 2012), http://unfccc.int/cooperation-support/leastdevelopedcountriesportal/
napa priorities database/items/4583.php.
309. The Gambia, National Adaptation Programme of Action (Nov. 2007), available at
http://unfecc.int/resource/docs/napa/gmb0l.pdf; Republic of Cape Verde, National Adaptation
Programme of Action (Dec. 2007), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/cpv01 .pdf;'People's
Republic of Bangladesh, National Adaptation Programme of Action (Nov. 2005), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/ban0.pdf; see also supra note 296 (citing examples of states'
NAPAs that fail to incorporate human rights considerations).
3 10. An attainable starting point from a broader legislative perspective might be for states to
move quickly to enact legislation, such as the 1990 U.S. statute that provides temporary protected status
to persons in the United States if "there has been an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other
environmental disaster in the state resulting in a substantial, but temporary, disruption of living
conditions in the area affected." 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006). Although not enacted for the
purpose of addressing climate adaptation, such legislation could allow persons facing climate change-
related injuries to seek protection in other states.
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Angola, unlike many other poorly developed countries, included human
rights in its NAPA. As discussed above, Angola's NAPA recognizes the right
to food and explains that one of the responses the government should take in
fulfilling this right is to "creat[e] and implement[] national and local rapid
warning systems, monitoring systems for food and nutritional security."31' Just
as providing basic shelter after a natural disaster could be prioritized above
other adaptation expenses, food security, in the form of emergency aid or
otherwise, could require government prioritization in the face of a climate-
related disaster. Over a longer time horizon, governments could recognize that
to the extent climate change destroys certain agricultural economies, ensuring
that the population of those areas has basic nutritional security should be
prioritized over adaptation projects that do not achieve human rights goals.
Angola's NAPA, therefore, although it contains only a short reference to the
interplay of adaptation and basic human rights, is an important development for
the advancement of human rights considerations in adaptation policy strategies.
Finally, human rights have an immediate role to play in adaptation policy
at the international level. At least one commentator has argued that the
"foremost challenge facing the contemporary human rights-climate change
agenda" is how to resolve the "fundamental disconnect" between
acknowledging the relationship between climate change and human rights and
acting on this understanding in climate change negotiations. 312 In part, this
challenge may be so vexing because the international actors involved have
typically focused climate change discussions on mitigation. As the discussions
have increasingly considered adaptation alongside mitigation, it is easier to
envision how human rights could begin to play a concrete role in climate
negotiations-for example, by encouraging the recognition of climate change
refugees.
In short, a rights-based approach to adaptation that sounds in the language
of human rights is more "achievable and fair" than a similar discourse
regarding mitigation. 3 13 It "potentially provides a platform for broad-based
dialogue on burden-sharing of a kind that has frequently lacked in climate
change debates." 314 Adopting a human rights focus to long-term adaptation
needs also "would help to orient future research, set priorities, assist in
evaluation and galvanise support." 3is
C. The Impact ofAdaptation on Political Mobilization
A human rights-based approach to adaptation would be useful not only as
a basis for developing and prioritizing policy, but also in expressing
internationally agreed-upon values that can form the basis for increased
311. Angola National Adaptation Programme of Action, supra note 73, at 77-78.
312. Limon, supra note 55, at 466.
313. ICHRP, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 7.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 25.
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common action towards adaptation.316 To this end, commentators discussing
the linkages between human rights and climate change have often discussed the
ethical or moral power of climate change to mobilize political action,
encouraging policymakers to adopt "robust, effective, and sustainable"
policies.317 Some commentators have argued that recognizing how climate
change implicates human rights is a necessary first step in mobilizing political
support to combat the problem.318 For example, as David Hunter argues, "the
right to food, water, and shelter after a natural disaster may generate demands
for humanitarian response." 319 Moreover, recognizing such infringements
before, during, and after the disaster could place political and legal pressure on
developing countries to respond in a non-discriminatory, human rights-
sensitive manner to the extent of the available resources. In addition,
recognizing that such infringements could have been avoided in the past and
could be averted in the future with proper adaptation practice may result in
pressure on industrialized countries to provide increased funding for fair and
human rights-sensitive adaptation. 320
While the ethical power of climate change could motivate either
mitigative or adaptive action, adaptation practices may be more effective in
mobilizing the political support necessary to address climate change, because
adaptation practices tend to be on a more human and local scale. More so than
mitigation, adaptation projects call for an added emphasis on the individuals
and communities affected.321 If a rights-based approach to climate policy
generally has the advantage of giving a human face to the climate change
challenge-because it "focuses on excluded and marginalized groups,
encourages accountability and transparency in policy decisions, encourages
participatory and democratic processes, and provides sustainable outcomes by
building on the capacity of key stakeholders" 322-this is likely even more true
for adaptation projects, which typically work at the community, household, or
individual level. Focusing on the human rights implications of a government's
failure to adapt, inability to adapt, or refusal to consider the perspectives of
those affected by its policy decisions may be more effective than focusing on
global environmental harms resulting from a state's refusal to meet its GHG
emission reduction obligations.
D. Proactive Policymaking
Finally, human rights can also help facilitate more proactive adaptation
316. See Kang, supra note 56.
317. Limon, supra note 55, at 458.
318. See Kravchenko, supra note 291, at 514.
319. Hunter, supra note 8, at 360.
320. Id.
321. See, e.g., Cameron, supra note 231, at 5 (noting that "[t]he world's most vulnerable people
. . . are also least likely to be the beneficiaries of climate funds, most of which gets spent on mitigation
(particularly energy projects) rather than adaptation").
322. Atapattu, supra note 32, at 45.
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policymaking. Ira Feldman and Joshua Kahan have described reactive
adaptation as the "ability to react to and deal with climate change after an event
and impacts have occurred."323 This is as opposed to proactive adaptation,
which "is represented in the act of anticipation, taking action to prevent and/or
reduce future impacts."324 Because it is often easier to make policy decisions
once a crisis has occurred rather than when it is only anticipated,325 policy
choices have historically amounted to reactive adaptation. 326 Consequentially,
these policy efforts have only been able to use present resources to address
present problems, which may sometimes be insufficient. Yet both proactive and
reactive adaptation responses are necessary to effectively address adaptation to
climate change.
Interestingly, proactive versus reactive adaptation is one area in which
introducing human rights concerns seems to complicate the analysis. Reactive
responses, when not combined with proactive adaptation practices, "tend to
have higher long term costs because the low costs of preventive action, or
anticipative adaptation, are likely to dominate the higher costs of deferred
,327action, or reactive adaptation, appropriately discounted." Thus, without the
perspective of human rights, proactive adaptation policies would clearly be
more efficient. However, because there likely will not be sufficient resources to
328fully adapt to climate change, considering human rights may move the
calculus more toward reactive adaptation policies in the wake of disasters, at
least when compared to proactive projects with uncertain value. Of course,
when the probability of a particular climate-related human rights breach
approaches one, proactive policies targeting these anticipated harms will trump
because of their value in protecting rights ex ante, as well as their overall lower
costs.
Feldman and Kahan have rejected this "degree of uncertainty" calculus,
noting that "even without precise knowledge of future events, proactive policy
planning for climate change adaptation improves the overall preparedness by
integrating adaptation considerations into the decision-making process."329 We
do not discuss the degree of uncertainty as an excuse for lessening the size of
the pie or slowing adaptation practices; instead we note it as a consideration in
the overall distributive calculus. And we agree with Feldman and Kahan that
"[d]ecision makers must realize that adaptation to climate change is a
imnanifestation of systems thinking and a process of active learning; we need to
323. Feldman & Kahan, supra note 56, at 67 (citation omitted).
324. Id.
325. Frank Lecocq & Zmarak Shalizi, Balancing Expenditures on Mitigation of and Adaptation
to Climate Change: An Exploration of Issues Relevant to Developing Countries 7 (World Bank Group,
Policy Research Working Paper No. 4299, 2007), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/externall
default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2007/08/02/000158349_20070802095523/Rendered/PDF/wps429.
pdf.
326. Feldman & Kahan, supra note 56, at 67.
327. Id. at 68.
328. See supra notes 300-301 and accompanying text (describing the adaptation deficit).
329. Feldman & Kahan, supra note 56, at 68.
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appreciate both proactive and reactive responses as we learn the new rules of
the game." 330 But, given the adaptation deficit, it is at least worth asking if
Feldman and Kahan have overstated the benefits of proactive adaptation and if
a human rights balancing process would tip the scales more in favor of reactive
policies in a world of limited funds.33 1
Human rights have importance far beyond reactively punishing
wrongdoing or seeking redress for harms, although they can be instrumental in
such endeavors. Human rights also enable a range of proactive measures,
including human rights-informed policy decisions. In the context of climate
change, for example, human rights can be "a forward-looking means of
encouraging the evolution of, and providing a qualitative contribution to,
robust, effective, and sustainable policy responses at both the national and
international level, across mitigation and adaptation." 332 And these human
rights considerations are especially relevant to adaptation, as adaptation efforts
"can be made more effective if policy-makers include human rights criteria (or
thresholds) when they assess future harms, identify areas of likely vulnerability
and evaluate comparatively the various policy measures available for treating
identified challenges."333
VI. CONCLUSION
The world must adapt to rising temperatures, rising seas, and rising
climate vulnerabilities by charting a common and aggressive course that
includes policymakers, NGOs, and residents of the global community. The
moral and legal duty to do so effectively is paramount if the world is to avoid
the growing risk of adaptation apartheid. Many commentators and international
bodies have recognized that applying human rights norms to climate change-
related injuries could prove normatively beneficial, particularly since it is likely
that the most disadvantaged and least-prepared global citizens will suffer the
greatest consequences of a warming climate that they played a negligible role
in creating. Nonetheless, reconciling this justice-based position within an
oftentimes rigid human rights framework has proven challenging. It is difficult
to frame doctrinally sound legal claims that can address those actors that caused
and should be held accountable for climate change. Considering climate change
adaptation more specifically, however, is both normatively desirable and more
legally tenable. Adaptation-related human rights claims-together with
330. Id.
331. Of course, not every climate change impact will be properly defined as a "crisis," and
dealing with these impacts before they get to crisis stage is likely to be cheaper and more effective in the
long run. See, e.g., ADAPTATION WORKING GROUP, ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: WHY
ADAPTATION POLICY IS MORE DIFFICULT THAN WE THINK (AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT), WISCONSIN
INITIATIVE ON CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS 10 (Oct. 2010) (citing stormwater planning standards as an
example of an adaptive strategy that has higher short-term costs but may result in significant long-term
savings), available at http://itep68.itep.nau.edulitepdownloads/ClimateAdaptationResources/WICCI_
CCAdaptationReport.pdf.
332. Limon, supra note 55, at 458.
333. ICHRP, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 80.
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analyses of diagonally conceived human rights-can help afford global citizens
a more robust international legal framework within which to address climate
change. Moreover, insights drawn from human rights should begin to play a
larger role in formulating adaptation policy and projects since these projects
will undoubtedly have human implications and a disproportionate impact on
vulnerable persons. A human rights approach to adaptation requires flexibility,
creativity, and temerity, and the law should evolve together with the strategies
for adapting to climate change. Finally, legal commentators should discuss how
climate adaptation connects with other areas of law that we have not considered
in detail, such as Alien Tort Claims Act cases, insurance liability, property
rights, and important procedural doctrines in international law.334 Understood
in this way, our discussion of adaptation and human rights is one of many steps
in understanding the impact of climate change on domestic and international
legal regimes and the rule of law more generally.
334. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2006) (discussing the role of U.S. standing
doctrine in one form of climate change litigation); Posner, supra note 212, at 1928-29 (arguing that
vindicating climate change-based claims through the Alien Tort Claims Act, or other types of litigation,
is normatively undesirable).
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